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Abstxaotf The Southern African region has attracted 
considerable interest from scholars and spectators in recent 
decades. Events in Southern Africa have always been highly 
influenced by both regional and global trends and shifts. 
Therefore, as the 1990's begin, analysis calls for a 
redefinition of the position in the changing regional and 
global environments, for small dependent states such as 
Swaziland, whose development and foreign policy operate within 
such constrained environamnts. The regional political economy 
has, up until now, large v been seen in terms of South 
Africa's hegemony or dominance. However, as the 1990'a begin, 
south Africa, the hegemonic power in the region, is in crisis. 
The rest of the region is going through some form or other of 
structural adjustment under the IMF/IBRD.
At the global level, the New International Division of Labour 
is evolving, making some states in the region seem even 
smaller in terms of production, industry, technology etc. For 
Swaziland, such difficulties in the global political economy 
have tended to reinforce rather than erode regional dependence 
on South Africa. These will have implications for the choices 
available to Swaziland's political economy in the 1990's and 
beyond.
Chmptmr i UatroAttctlfla 
I ttfttmMt of Th# P M b l M
As ths 1990's begin, the changes taking place in the 
Southern African region and in the wider global political 
econosy call into question the role which small dependent 
states like SwarilamI may assume i 1) in this region 
historically charactericed by conflict and co-operation and 2) 
in the interrelated and evolving New International Divisions 
of Labour and Power.
Swaziland has, since independence, adopted an 'open door* 
policy towards foreign capital, with its economy remaining 
subsequently highly de^ndent initially on South African and 
British-and then later, on US-capital. This has served the 
interests of the Swazi ruling class and foreign capital, both 
of whom have mutually benefited from this relationship.
In this r^ard, the historical develo^sent and nature of 
the Swazi state and the ideology of its ruling class, together 
with its structural dependence, have played a large role in 
shaping the nature of Swaziland's political economy since 
independence.
Swaziland's dependence on South Africa in the region is 
affected through and characterized mainly by its membership in 
the Southern African Custos» union agreement (SACU), the 
Common Monetary Area (CHA) agreement, the migrant labour 
system, and the regional infrastructure {roads, railways.
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bydro#lectriclty, t«l«ooaBunications etc.) Thus, Swaeiland'a 
development efforte and policiee in the 1970*# and the 1980*# 
have been highly determined and dependant on foreign capital^ 
i.e (South African, British and US capital). Although 
Swaeiland ha# tried in the last few years to redirect it# 
sources of finance and to find new source# of trade, these 
have been mainly in a f w  agricultural products, mainly sugar, 
on which Swaziland has Wcome increasingly dependent.
This process has served to increase the trend towards 
monoculture1 dependence on one or two agro-industrial 
products, produced for the world market, with obvious 
consequences in the evolving glc^l economy. Among others, 
international fluctuations in the price and demand for sugar 
has laid Swaziland's economy open to the vicissitudes of the 
world market economy as sugar has become the state's most 
important source of state revenue. This became more evident in 
the 1970's and early 1980's when the price of sugar collapsed, 
resulting in a substantial increase in the country's otherwise 
low level of debt.
in the 1990's, with the reforms and changes occurring in 
South Africa and the whole region, the nature of relations 
among the actors both inside and outside the region are 
changing and are being continuously shaf^ and re-shaped by 
unfolding events. Internationally, Swazilaiul's pro-capitalist 
stance and dependence on foreign capital has laid it oj^n to 
following a pro-Wes tern policy in foreign relations, which, to
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a large extent, hae not incroaaed its degree of national 
Independence in international affaire. On the ctmtrrry, much 
foreign dMinawe hae relegated SvaxilamI to a poeitlw of 
being primarily an agricultural producer for the EC, US and 
world sarkete, rather than opting for greater 
induatriali cation.
In the 1990*e, with global régionalisation (Europe 1992 
and the possible North American Free Trade Agreement) and vith 
growing protectionism in the North, swaeiland'a econmay may 
face further decline as the prospecte for finding new markets 
for its exports decline.
Swaziland hae been able to reap the benefits of sanctions 
against South Africa in the late 1970*s end early 19#0'e, with 
the subsequent relocation of firms evading sanctions, and for 
a while it seemed like a little 'success story*. However, such 
gains are not likely to be self-sustaining in the medium-term 
future. '
As we move towards the end of the twentieth century, with 
the end of the cold War, ami of superpower intervention, 
which had largely shaped events in the country only primarily 
manifest in the form of IW/IBRD SAP conditional item, 
countries such as Swaziland are increasingly being left to 
find their own solutions and directions.
Also, with the end of the Cold War, the whole region is 
unlikely to remain attractive to foreign investment in the 
near-to medium-term future. The little foreign investment may
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flow i# likely to tm concentrated in South Africa beoauee of 
it# relatively developed Infrastrueuture and communication 
network.
Furthermore, with South Africa in political and economic 
crieis (with possible spill-over effects likely to have 
serious implications for Swaeiland), and with the rest of the 
region going through s o w  form of structural adjustment, the 
end of apartheid in South Africa will not necessarily enable 
states such as Swaeiland to isprove their position in the Sew 
International Division of Labour. In fact, if anything, 
Swaziland is likely to become further marginalised.
Therefore, the choices which Swaziland's political 
economy will have to make in the 1990's are likely to be even 
harder. It seems likely that Swaziland in the 1990's will need 
to redefine, redirect and reassert its role both in the region 
and in the evolving international Divisions of Labour and 
Power. Hence, the timeliness of this thesis, informed by 
revisionist analyses. Before outlining my own perspective, I 
turn first to a review of the rather limited-both in approach 
and extent- literature on the frameworks of Swaziland's 
foreign policy and political economy prior to the 1990's.
2 rramworkB
Swaslland's political aoommy has always baan highly 
infiuancad by both ragional a M  global trends and transitions. 
Thus, ths pravailing tnmmvorkm for ths analysis of swaei 
political aconomy overlap, intsrrslata ami change ovar time, 
a reflection of the dynamic nature of the shifts and changes 
in political economy ai^roachas at both regional and global 
levels, especially since the 19€0's,
Gill and lew, in their book The Global Political Economy 
see political economy as "an integrated field that 
encompasses the specialised disciplines of j^litics, sconmics 
and international relations,”' They argue, "more 
fundamentally, political economy requires analysis of the way 
in which ideas about what constitutes the political arki the 
economic have merged historically.”*
% e  1950's s M  1960 *s saw the ascemlency of the 
modernization oaradioa which largely adopted a dualist 
approach to develo]^nt for Swaziland as elsewhere. The 
dualist theory asserts tliat every economy, densestio and 
international, must be analysed in terms of two relatively 
independent sectorsi a modem, more industrialised sector 
characterized by a high level of productive efficiency and 
economic integration, and a traditional more agricultural 
sector characterised by a backward mode of production and 
self-sufficiency.
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litis orthod<M( thsory arguss that tha pcooass of aoonoaic 
davalopmsnt invoivas tha incorporation and transformation of 
tha traditional saotor into a stodam sactor through ths 
wodamiration of aconoaic, social and political structuras, in 
this regard, ths integration of tha lasu davalopad world into 
tha world aoonoay was saan as mutually banaficial, promoting 
davalopsant and avidancing harmonious intardapandanca katwaan 
tha davalopad and the developing world. As Gilpin further 
observes: ' 'global integration of markets and institutions is 
the consaquanca of an inexorable movement of economic forces 
toward higher levels of economic efficiency and global 
interdependence. **’
Trade, most liberal modernisers argue, constitutes an 
'engine of growth'. Although the domestic forces of growth are 
more important, the latter process is greatly assisted by 
international flows of trade, capital and productive 
technology. The law of comparative advantage advocated by 
David Ricardo implies that domestic and international 
societies should be organised in terms of relative efficiency. 
"It implies a universal division of labour based on 
specialization, in which each participant benefits absolutely 
in accordance with his or her contribution to the whole."* A 
fundamental harmony of interest among individuals, groups and 
states is assumed in the modernization paradigm to underlie 
the growth of the market and economic interdependence. 
Traditional Marxists believe that these external forces
9
promote economic development by breaking the bonds of 
conservative social structures. Most studies on Swaziland, 
especially in the 1960*8 and I970's, were largely inspired by 
the orthodox morlemization approach, and tended to adopt this 
dualist perspective. The major thesis of the dualist 
perspective is to posit a historical parallelism between two 
separate economies, the traditional and the mc^ern.
Within such a perspective, in terms of my case study, 
Fair, Murdoch and Jones in the late 1960*s begin by saying 
’♦the most significant event in the economic history of 
Swaziland, as in most of Africa, was the gradual introduction 
of the modern money enonomy to a society whose economy was 
traditional, subsistent, local and self-reliant.*** Gavin 
Haasdorp (1990) reiterates the same view when he observes how 
the Swazi have been exposed to the modern industrial and 
commercial economy for over a century: '‘Even the most remote 
places have had contact with this modern economy."*
But, as Palmer and Parsons (1977) argue, from another 
BKsre radical perspective “ this assertion flies fully in the 
face of historical evidence which shows how the Swazi have 
been progressively integrated into a sub-continental labour 
produce market over many decades."^ Thus, during this 
contea^rary period, the enclaves of capitalist dsvelo^sent 
carved out in Swaziland were not designed to integrate with 
local market conditions, but purely to produce exports for the 
South African and world markets and thereby boost state and
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foreign private revenues. Palmer and Parsons go on to argue
that this development
Resembles in miniature the development pattern of South 
Africa, of which it has been a subsidiary growth pole. 
Its 'dual econtmy' is emphatically not one of two 
separate economies in parallel development. It is one t 
dominant and surbodinate sectors within one economic 
system, brought into being and maintained through the 
legal and administrative machinery of the state.*
Host writers on Swazi political economy during this 
contemporary period identified what they considered four types 
of dualism: sectoral dualism, spatial dualism, dualism of land 
tenure, and social dualism. There are those extreme 
modernizers who went so far as to argue that there was also 
political dualism in the Swazi state. (Absolom Vilakazi. 1979) 
Sectoral dualism, which was somewhat geographic in 
articulation, was seen as evident in the existence side by­
side of the modem and traditional sectors. Writers such as 
Pair, Murdoch and Jones (1969) traced the roots of such 
dualism to the economic history cf the country and how it was 
slowly integrated into the world capitalist system. The 
traditional structure was one of a subsistence economy, whose 
foundations had been seriously undermined by the end of the 
ninenteenth century, with the Swazi loss of self-sufficiency.
The way in ^hich certain core areas in the country were 
developed as opposed to the rest which remained underdeveloped 
was seen as evidence of 'spatial dualism*. Pair et al (1969) 
identified four core areas situated mainly around the major 
towns. There was found to be a wide disparity between Wie core
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town#. There was found to b# a wide disparity between the core 
and periphery in terms of population density, total output 
production, wage employment etc. Furthermore, the periphery 
was said to be less well-endowed than the core in terms of 
natural resources. The predominant means of production in the 
periphery was subsistence farming. Functional linkages between 
the core areas and the periphery and among the core areas 
themselves are weak. As Haasdorp argues ''The core areas are 
strongly oriented to centres in South Africa and Mozambique, 
whereas the periphery tended to be isolated from the 
mainstream of economic development.”*
The 1907 Land Proclamation Act, which had facilitated the 
expropriation of two-thirds of tha land surface by the 
colonial government for vdiite settlers, thus confining the 
Swazi to the so-called 'native areas, ' is said to have created 
dualism in land tenure. I^velopmant tended to be highly 
concentrated on the farm land, most of which falls within the 
core areas, whilst ths latter, coaminal land tenure prevails 
on Swazi Nation Land (SKL) which contains 84% of the total 
population, most of whose area falls mostly in the peri^ery.
The presence of a small European settler community which 
held administrative as well as economic power until 
independence in 1968 was said to be a sign of social dualism. 
Since then, though political power has passed to tha Swazi, 
the European community still dominates the econmny, albeit in 
association with the Swazi state and bourgeiosle.
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Th« CO-existence of the parliamentary and traditional
systems of government was said to be evidence of political
dualism, a system that had been retained at independence when
Swaziland became a constitutional monarchy with a
Westminister-type constitution. The independence constitution*
however* has since been abrogated. Thus since 1973* it could
be argued that there has been less such dualism.
By the 1970* s, this prevailing modernization paradigm
came under very severe criticism from other social scientists
in the Third World* especially in Latin America. The
modernization paradigm was further weakened by its inability
to explain real developments in the Third World during the
1960's* as pointed out by dependency theorists such as Dos
Santos (1970) and Frank (1967* 1969). The modernization
paradigm had assumed mutual interdependence and harmony of
interests among states, both developed and underdeveloped,
Thus* the concept of Interdependence was taken to imply a
relatively symmetrical set of interrelationships aixi benefits
among states and peoples. However* in the real world* this is
rarely the case. As Keohane and Hye were to later caution:
A state of interdependence between two actors does not 
entail an even distribution of the benefits- a 
relationship of interdependence is not free from 
distributional conflict whether expressed in 
maximization of benefits or avoidance of costs.^
Hence, %»obane and Hye conclude that* "in terms of concrete
analysis* tha question of the relative distribution of gains
and loses should be at the very centre of interest.
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The deTCTïdencv eppraaCfa eserged e& the critique of the 
modemigation paradigm, and different conceptualizations of 
the problem of development were developed through it. The 
dependency approach has a complex intellectual origin, ranging 
from Marxism (or rather Marxism-Leninism) neo-Marxism and 
Latin American structurelism. These differed in style, 
emphasis, disciplinary orientation and ideological 
preferences, but they shared the central basic idea about 
development and underdevelopment as interrelated processes.
Frank, one of the most prominent dependency theorists, 
explicitly rejects dualist theories of development. The 
dualist theories characterise underdeveloped countries as 
possessing two sharply distinguished sectors, one modem, 
dynamic, and integrated into the world economy, and the other, 
traditional, stagnant, often feudal, supplying labour but 
little else to the former. Frank ai^es that individual 
underdeveloped countries are internally integrated through the 
permeation of merchant capital: "Indeed, ttu world capitalist 
ecMiomy is a single integrated w h o l e , h e  argues.
The dependency thesis saw the most important obstacles to 
development as ^sanating outside the underdeveloped economy, 
rather than from internal sources. Thus, contrary to 
modernization theory, obstacles to development were not lack 
of capital or entrepreneurial skills, but were located in the 
international division of labour. % e  latter was analysed in 
terms of the developed centre and the underdeveloped
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p«ri{^ary. A transfer of surplus took place from the peri^ery 
to the centre.
Dependency theorists, (especially Frank's development of 
underdevelopment thesis,1966) believe that the world market 
operates to the disadvantage of the dependent economy and 
domestic welfare. Trade, in their view, is an engine of 
exploitation, of underdevelopment, ami for more advanced 
economies, of economic decline, not of growth. As Frank 
argues,
evidently, the production and export of staple raw 
materials after about four centuries has not yet had a 
capacity to transform most of Asia, latin America and 
Africa into industrial capitalist producers and has drawn 
them into a staple trap or at least into a low level 
disequilibrium trap, from which they are less able to 
escape through capitalist development,^^
The dependency perspective went beyond the problem of
structural dependency. It also implied a self-reliant approach
to development thinking as such, an indigeniration of
development theory. Ihis perspective, which was a clear break
with the modernization parwiigm is particularly appzurent in
the following definition by Dos Santos:
Dependence Is a conditioning situation in which the 
econwies of one group of countries are conditioned by 
the development and expansion of others. A relationship 
of interdependence between two or more economies or 
between such economies and the world tradii^ system 
becomes a dependent relationship when seme c<mntries 
CM: expand only as a reflection of the expansion of 
the dominant countries, which say have positive o r 
negative effects on their immediate development.(Dos 
Santos,1970)^
Since the periphery was dopMd to underdevelop because of
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its linkage to the centre, it was ooneidered necessary from 
this perspective for a country to disassociate itself free the 
world market, to break the chains of surplw extraction and to 
strive for national and collective self-reliance, as in the 
context of the New International Economic Order (NIBO) as 
advanced by the group of 77*
However, mostly because it. put the blame solely on 
external factors, the dependency perspective fell into great 
disrepute by the 1970's. The most severe challenge to the 
development of underdevelopment thesis was represented by the 
Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), who in the early 
1970*s rapidly industrialized. At the empirical level, the 
NICs experience of achieving phenomenal growth has been used 
for the refutation of dependency. But, as is evident in the 
continuing discourses between these approaches, "the 
controversy over the role of the world market in the global 
distribution of wealth, power and welfare constitutes one of 
the most intensely debatable divisive questions in political 
ectmoay.
In the southera African region, in the I960's and 1970>s, 
largely as a result of the dominance of the dependwwy s<^ool 
in development thinking, most analyses started fr«s the 
premise, implicitly or e3q>licitly, that whatever happened in 
the region was attributable to South Africa’s action or 
inaction, and that the ensuing developments of the 
neighbouring environment were reflections thereof. As
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To»t#n##n puts it ''ths dspsndsncs of the Southern African 
states on their giant neighbour South Africa/ has become an 
axiom in practically any discussion of thm political economy 
of the region."’* It was during this period that writers such 
as Kenneth Grundy argued "the most imposing structural 
characteristic of Southern African affairs is the virtually 
unchalleng«i economic domination of the RSA. This, more than 
any other single fact/ has determined the economic, military 
and diplomatic networks that are being constructed in the 
region."’̂ Neo-Marxists such as Samir Amin (1974,6 1976), 
Mlttelman (1971) and Frank (1981) take a similar position, 
arguing that since South Africa has economic control of the 
* inputs' of the economies of regional states such as labour 
and raw materials, this enables South Africa to manipulate 
these economies.
Swaziland's integration into the regional political 
economy dates as far back as the last century. It has since 
been institutionalized through SAW, RMA and labour migration. 
At the peak of the dependem^y approach in the 1970's, most 
studies on Swaziland focused on its structural surbodination 
to the South African economy, es^asizing its land-locked 
position and the transportation and trade consequences that 
flow therefrom. This is further exacerbated by its 
participation in SACU, fôlA, migrant labour and regional 
infrastructure, etc. As J.S Crush puts it:
The severe trade iW&a lance and the structures tdiich
maintain it, including the customs union, are one set 0
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dependency parameter*. Underlying thoee hoover, 1# t h e  
role of the KhC's in Swaeiland'a dependency 
relation with South Africa, a role that has 
intensified, not diminished, since independence".̂
Some of the scholarly discourse during the current period is 
situated within the starker versions of underdevelopment 
theory. According to this view, the three small states 
neighbouring South Africaners treated as if they are so 
completely dependent upon South Africa that politically they 
are hostage s t a t e s . T h i s  is attributed to the fact that 
they are geographically encompassed by the RSA, they lack 
resources and they need to export Ifübour to South Africa, in 
most of the literature which adopts this approach, * *the 
prevailing view is that those governments could not survive a 
disruption of their economic relationships with South Africa. 
The political implication is that they also could not afford 
to challenge the South African political regime.
within this approach, Swaziland's political economy is 
seen to be so structurally surbodinated to international 
(particularly South African) interests that the resultant 
internal structures have no choice but to conduct a foreign 
l^licy that reflects this dependency. Jack Balpsm {196S}, 
Arnold Isaacs (1988) and others espouse this view.
This analysis has been criticised essentially for 
treating ths ration's states as mere appendices to South 
Africa a M  merely as passive objects of its policies and not 
as subjects or actors in their own right. It has also be«m
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criticind for falling to tak# account of tha rola of IntamaX
power atructuraa, claaaas and idaologias that play a
significant rola in shaping tha political aconoaiaa of thaaa
fitataa* Ka ttugyanyi has arguad,
Tha logic of axtamal capital ooncaptualisaa Swaziland 
as a ctmprador state with a ruling class that is no 
more than a stooge of im^riallsm, and in which tha 
axtamal relationship with South Africa and Britain is 
saan as all datamlning relations for tha Swazi 
aconomy and socio-political structures.
Furthermore, this dapandancy framework has been criticised for 
failing to distinguish batwaan economic and political forms of 
domination: "Thus by denying it any measure of real as
op^sad to formal independence, Swaziland is put on more or 
lass tha same footing as South Africa's Bantustans."^
Beginning from tha 1980's, however, this dominant 
dependency perspective started changii^. Tha other states are 
increasingly seen as taking independent initiatives ami 
adopting policies sometimes at variance with those preferred 
by South Africa. This approach essentially argues that every 
state in the region, including South Africa is to some degree 
able to manipulate regional economic ties to serve its own 
domestic and foreign policy objectives and at the same time is 
itself affected these changes.
Following from this, states in the region are 
increasingly seen as Interd^mndent with, rather than simply 
dependent upon, south Africa, the dominant national economy in 
the region. Therefozv, according to this approach, while South
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Africa'» domination of tha rational aconomy anablaa it to 
axart great economic leverage over other atatee, in eo doing 
its own domaatic aconomy and politic» are affected, A further 
development eince the lace 1970'» to 1980's with theoretical 
as mil as developmental implication» was that state» in the 
region began to make collective efforts, rather than act only 
individually. Examples in ths 1970’s include the Front Line 
States (FL£) and in the early 1980's the formation of SADCC, 
whose main aim was to disengage from and reduce dependence on 
South Africa.
Host importantly, this approach places the region's 
economic relationships into the context of the domestic and 
national politics of Southern African states. As Libby puts 
it:
Instead of inferring the costs aiwl benefits to ruling 
groups stemming fn»& their economic relationships with 
other states in the region, this approach seeks to 
evaluate also the political significance of these 
relationships in termn of their impact upon the ruling 
party, class or group and the political opposition to 
them in each state in the region,^
Host recent approaches dismiss the first two perspectives,
dependency and interdependency as inadequate in grasping the
dynamics of those factors which shape the political economies
of states in the region. The »3st current literature g w w
beyond material factors to include issues of contradiction and
coalition, race and class, production and distribution.
From such a radical perspective, Daniel, Vi lane, Kugyenyi
and others, have argued that the depei^Utncy and wdemisation
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analyses of Swssl political economy is inoomplste. They argue
that the relationship hetwsen Swaeiland and South Africa is
not only due to geopolitical factors or structural features,
but also to the c%Bpradorial nature of the Swaci ruling class,
whose position, interests and ideology share much in common
with that of South Africa. A cm^rative analysis of Lesotho
arul SwBSilai^*s relations with South Africa carried out by
Daniel in 19S4 reached the same conclusion.
These differences, argue the authors, illustrate that
Even in the imperialist context of Southern Africa 
there are options and degrees of submissiveness and 
collaboration and that econmaic dtmination and 
coercion, as well as the use of threat of military 
jĵ wer, should not be seen as the sole determinants of 
regional relations between the government of South 
Africa and the liberation forces opposing it.^
Essentially, much of the literature using this non-traditional 
approach disputes an important component of dependency theory, 
the concept of imperialist hegemony which suggests that all 
phenomena of significance in the African political economy are 
the products of ^nii^tant external forces and that local 
forces are irrelevant.
Thus, in terms of global political economy, these authors 
expose the inadequacies of the simple instrumental 1st model of 
nso-colonial dependence developed by the I960*s Latin 
Aatericanists and later applied to the whole Third World. 
Contrary to the modernisation approaches which espoused the 
vimt that it was beneficial for the developing world to be 
integrated into the world sconcnay, and the exti^me
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formulation# of d«p#nd#ncy theory (the development of
underdeveloiment theeie), "the leet decode hae eeen the
growth of a dramatic prooeee of etructural change in the
world's economic order unimagined in that optimistic period of
boom and growth in the 1950's and 1960'#."^ The emerging
NIDL involves the relocation of iiuiustry from the advanced to
at least soma of the underdeveloped countries as well as a
marked increase of manufactured products exported from the
Third World as a percentage of the total export of
manufactured goods. As Higgott puts iti
The essence of the new division is greater specialisation 
in the production process and the ensuing facility of 
location and relocation of productive activity. Within 
the context of recent international political aoonoay 
there is now cognised the facility for the location and 
relocation of international capital into those regions of 
the imrld providing the greatest returns.*^
Nittelman argues that *'although industrialisation is not a 
magic remedy for the problems of underdevelopment, upgrading 
the role of manufacturing is a key component of productive 
economic growth."^
There is a consensus in the literature, however, that 
Africa has not kept pace in this global manufacturing system 
and in the related increase of export activities, i.e, Four^ 
rather than Third World. Traditionally, LOC'S were integrated 
into the world economy as suppliers of » w  materials and 
ocassionally of cheap labour. Still today primary commodities 
coB^rise 85% of their exerts. After World War 11 mist LOC'S 
adopted import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), Only
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mo#ntXy they v r m  forced via structural adjustment to adopt 
export-led industrialisation. Henoe, Hittelaan's conclusion is 
that "the insertion into the lower reaches of the global 
manufacturing system may even deepen underdevelopment by 
reinforoii^ dependence on selective imports« especially 
capital gwds and entails limits in terms of participation in 
ctnapetitive international markets."*
Shaw echoes this revisionist perspsctive: "Clearly, in 
such an environ^nt of uncertainty, the choices available to 
the least developed countries (the so-called fourth World) 
especially Africa in the 1990*s and beyond are severely 
constrained not only by the immediate realities of structural 
adjustment, but also by the continuing difficulties of the 
emerging global economy."*
in terms of the BLS in particular he argues "Africa's 
position in the NIDL is hardly privileged or promising. 
Rather, the global periphery may become even more marginal in 
a post industrial period."*
As Richard Higgot earlier put it "Africa is being drawn 
into this division in a subordinate manner and this 
subordination is in turn conditioning the nature of political 
behaviour in Africa- particularly with regard to the form and 
functions which characterize the peripheral state in the last 
quartsr of the century."* In this context, national 
adjustment at the state or sub-state level in the Third World 
is seen as stuoh more important than global adjustment, or more
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plainly, a movement towards a because SAP is the
dfminant ideology and KIEO impossible. * 'Arguments for a HZEO 
sight have had currency in a situation where notions of 
'unequal exchange' were influential, but in a situation where 
the utility of comparative advantage is reasserted 
{rhetorically if not empirically}, demands for a radical 
restructuring of the economic order can be pushed to one 
aldo."*®
In the Southern African region, the move towards the 
dismantling of apartheid and the transformation of its 
regional political economy have coincided with the rise and 
subsequent decline of both European and South African 
capitalisms, with profound implications for the balance among 
regional and global economies: "Thus, any analysis of
contemporary change has to take account of both sub- and 
super-structure, the dynamics of political economy. 
Difficulties in the global economy have tended to reinforce 
rather than erode regional dependence on South Africa."*®
Furthermore, issues of race and class, production and 
distribution come into sharp focus in the literature that goes 
beyond the contemporary conjuncture to post-apartheid south 
Africa. There seems to be a general consensus in the debate 
that the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa will not 
necessarily solve the problems of race and class, production 
and distribution which have afflicted the region for many 
decades.
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As Alan Hhitssids argues, even from a more orthodox 
perspective, recent political developments in South Africa 
have resulted in severe economic problems; "The trend of 
disinvestment and the pressure of sanctions are unlikely to 
diminish and will have dire conssnquences for the economy. 
This will obviously affect the national economies of South 
Africa's neighbours, the region and its 
interrelationships. •***
The evolving NIDL and structural adjustment all impact 
upon the states in the region, big and small. As Timothy Shaw 
argues "analysis in terms of regional and national strategies 
has to absorb local shifts as well as global trends: changing 
regional as well as national terms of t r a d e . H o w e v e r ,  
unlike "surbordinate state system formulations, such local 
interrelatedness cannot be taken out of global context: 
regional and international relations together compound 
external factors for small states in the region. 
Furthermore, in the post Cold-War era, "with heightened 
competition among transnational corporations for profits, the 
role of regionalism is increasingly important. Vet, the 
scholarly discourse in the NIDL emphasizes the world-wide 
integration of industry and globalization of finance, but 
fails to conceptualize the regional and subregional divisions 
of labour.
Shaw along with others has argued that in the NIDL, very 
few small states are viable, let alone es^ansive. Hong-Kong,
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Kuwait and Singapore are in the minority of viable-even 
vibrant-ssall etatee. Host lelaiui or land-locI»d countries are 
Fourth rather than Third itorld, a reflection of their relative 
decline in the NIDL."** In a small way, Swaziland in the 
19S0*s reaped the benefits of a mini-industrial boom, as a 
result of firms relocating in an attempt to evade sanctions. 
Shaw observes that' ' Swaziland seems to reflect the ability of 
one small state to resist further decline by making itself 
available as a conduit for South African and international 
capital, trade and investment."*’ But, as de Vletter 
cautions;
There is little doubt that the sudden inflow of capital 
will benefit the economy, but the fragility of tiie 
motives for many of the firms cannot be overes^asized. 
Swaziland may be attractive those wanting to leave 
South Africa, but the region as a wlu>le remains 
unstable, and for the time being, there are unlikely to 
be many extra-regional investors interested in 
opportunities in Southern Africa, save for ways of 
exploiting sanctions and instability.*®
Thus clearly, "the options taken taken by small states becomi 
all the more Important given the persistence of recession and 
retrenchment globally and apartheid, regionally. In other 
words, economic development becomes both more difficult in the 
light of the former and more confrontational in the light of 
the latter."*’
Therefore, these developments inevitably raise the 
question: will Swaziland’s position be both in tl^
evolving regional and global economies, especially given that 
the region as a whole is unlikely to remain attractive to many
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•xtra-rsgionBl invaetors in the immédiate post-apartheid 
period? This question has not been adequately addressed in 
the existing literature on Swaziland.
With the whole region going through structural 
adjustment, a severe drought, and growing informal sectors, 
the range of issues to be analysed has to be expanded. 
Clearly, these are areas which need further research, and 
though this study cannot claim to have answers to all these 
questions, it will allude to some of them and throw further 
light on the nature of the problematic. The study hopes to go 
beyond modernization, dependency and interdependency to a more 
holistic approach which embraces the dynamic nature of the 
problematic.
It is the basic thesis of the stwiy that Swaziland's 
incorporation into both the regional and international 
political economies has fostered and shaped its political 
economy since independence, and is likely to continue to do so 
in the futuxe. In this regard, the changes occurring in both 
the regional and global political economies, the forror 
characterized mainly by the transition towards majority rule 
in South Africa) and the latter by the end of the Cold War and 
the evolving NIDL & NIDP, a M  going to continue to have 
significant impact on the development and direction of 
Swaziland's political economy in the 1990's and beyond. And 
conversely, changing social forces in Swaziland itself are not 




The study has been undertaken through library research, 
my own research and knowlWge in Swaziland, secondary sources 
of data, and other documents.
The data will be evaluated to mainly ans%rer questions 
pertaining to the interaction of the state and the market as 
the embodiment of politics and economics in the modem world. 
Specifically, data will be evaluated to answer such questions 
as bow the state and its associated political processes affect 
the production, accumulation and distribution of wealth. 
Furthermore, the effect of economic forces on the distribution 
of power and welfare among states, classes and different 
groups will be addressed. Also, data will be evaluated and 
contrasted with coi^arative evidence frwa the other two 
countries which constitute the BIS (Botswana and Lesotho) 
region, mainly Lesotho, which exists in a structural position 
similar to Swaziland both in regards to South Africa and the 
world econi^y.
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ga«attt-,if THEL KATIOSAL POLITICAL ECONOMY.
1 8i#tory
The modem Swasi state emerged in the early nineteenth 
century as part of the process of regional state 
formation and dissolution triggered by the rise of 
Shake Zulu's e^ire.^
By the 1860's, the Swazis had successfully fought against 
the threat of incorporation into the Transvaal, and had 
settled in what is now present-day Swaziland as a host^enous 
group with a clearly developed power structure; the power 
structure was comprised of the monarch, senior princes and 
(Aiefs, Wiose control over land allocation constituted the 
basis of their power and material wealth. It was soon after 
this period that Swaziland e;q)erienced massive penetration by 
foreign capital and colonial take-over by Britain. The total 
impact of this was the subsequent land expropriation (under 
Kinq Hbandzeni), which produced local effects that were to 
become a permanent feature of Swaziland's political economy 
for many decades to come.
King Sobbuza II ascended the throne in 1921, and spent 
the early part of his reign negotiating for the return of the 
land which had been alienated through the 1907 Land Partition 
Proclamation Act. As part of the process to regain lt»t land, 
this period saw the levying of various royal taxes on the 
King's subjects, most of whom had to migrate to the South 
African mines to earn mon&y to pay for them.
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When the process of decolonisation began in the 1960'e, 
there was a proliferation of political parties, most of which 
were influenced and sWbseguently organised around Pan- 
Africanist lines. The most militant of these was the Kgwane 
National Liberatory Congress (NNLCJ.
However, faced with such increasing internal opiHssition, 
the Swazi monarch had sought ways of consolidating its hold on 
state power by aligning itself with fozoign capital interests 
investing in the country. It is during this period that the 
King formed his own political party, the Xmbokodvo National 
Movement (INK), organized on traditional lines. The XNH's 
conservative position readily accomodated the interests of the 
British, Afrikaner and other foreign investors in the country, 
from whom it scon gained wide support. Largely because of the 
support from foreign capital, the INM captured all seats in 
the post-independence legislature. In essence, the INK, in its 
articulation of the ideology of tradition, actually expressed 
the political and class interests of the Swazi aristocracy. It 
was, as Daniel argues * 'comiitted to the absolute daalnation 
over the whole social formation of the monarchy and 
traditional custom, it also demanded for the monarchy monopoly 
control over mineral and land rights.”  ̂Indeed, by the time 
of independence, the s^narchy had gained back for the Swazi 
nearly half the land, which was subsequently controlled 
through the traditional land tenure system. ïfost importantly, 
as a 'reward* for protecting their interests, the British
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granted the monarchy mineral rightc with whlWi the King net up 
tiie Tibiyo Takangwane fund as a depository for all mineral 
royalties. Thus, in the final years of decolonisation, **a 
firm crystallisation of interests emerged between settlers, 
multinational capital and the Swasi aristocracy. It was this 
caution of intérêts which 1«1 to significant foreign 
investment and rapid economic growth in the years immediately 
following independence.”’
From Uiis early period, the Swazi monarch, through the 
IKK, b^an articulating a foreign policy position which was 
openly hostile twards the liberation forces, which were 
seeking independence from their colonial powers in the region 
and an alternative economic order to that of capitalism. In a 
speech in 1966, Prince Hakhosini Dlamini, the IKK leader, who 
became the first post-independence Prime Minister, summed up 
the IKM's position when he stated that ''Swazis regard 
comnunists as their biggest political enemy.”* He want on to 
assert that ''Communism has no place in Swazi life. would 
fight it hard if it ever found its way here.”’ On the eve of 
independence, be had attacked what he called ''terrorism 
directed against Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola.”* Daniel has 
also suggested that, "the ¥H expressed hostility at the armed 
efforts for liberation and independence of ZAFV, ZAMU, MFLA 
and ntHLIHO.”  ̂ Daniel further suggests that hence, on the 
part of the Swazi state, '*Wie hostility aimed fifteen years 
later at the ANC was nothing new but the renewed expression of
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Old politico! attitudM.***
In 1973, in what has com# to bm Knoim as the 'palace
coup', th# King scra^pad th# Constitution erring to it as
alien and incoapatible with the way of life of the Swazi),
abolished all political ^rties, closed do%m iwrllament,
established an any, aiu! introduced a detention without trial
provision. For five years be ruled by decree with all
executive, legislative and judicial powers vested in himself.
The leader of one of Uie sain opi^sition parties, Dr. Ambrose
Zwane, wno described the King's action as " a  seizure of power
by forces of fascism,"^ was detained. When parliament was
eventually re-opened in 1978, its members were now
determined by an electorial system so designed as to 
ensure domination by loyalists to traditional custom. 
Its functions were changed as well, stripped of 
independent policy-making authority, it was reduced to 
enacting into law the decisions of King Sobhuza and 
his advisors.'^
Thus, the Swazi ruliî r class, in an alliance forged with 
foreign capital, entered the j^st-iixSepejfuience period as the 
single most dominant group, and has largely remained so to 
date, with both developmental and foreign policy implications.
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2 «vmsiïuid'a Zitoexperatien Zato fh# World Capitaliot 
meonorny
Swaziland under colonial rulo ia too oftan depictad aa 
having haan a naglactad haokvatar of tha Britiah «gdza. 
Acquired for tha atratagic raaaon of protactii^f tha 
Eaatam flank of Briti^ capital on tha Hitvatararand, 
tha arguwnt ia that capital had no aaaantlal interaat in 
stmailand itaalf and that colonial capitaliam had only 
tha aoat minimal affact on tha aocial formation."
Thia viav haa oftan lad to a aiatakan conception of tha
svazi colonial axparianca. on tha contrary, from aa early aa
the beginning of tha t%rantiath century, Swaziland Iwgan
expariancing a saaaiva influx of mainly British and South
African capital(a), a procaaa which saw tha beginning of the
creation of tha depandanca atructuraa that ware to become the
central feature of Swaziland's political economy to data. This
procaaa also served to incorporate Swaziland into tha world
capitalist ayatam.
Tha period irmadiataly after World War II saw an 
acceleration of thia procaaa following tha discovery of 
minerals in tha Kingdom. Thia period saw a heavy influx of 
foreign capital to exploit mineral, agricultural and other 
resources in the Kingdom, and also supplies of cheap Swazi 
labour. The Colonial, later Comzonwaalth Development Council 
(COC) became the vehicle through which the vested interests of 
fozmign capital were articulated and implmzented. In a 
partnership forged with the Anglo-American Corporation and 
other South African intareata, tha COC became the dominant
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actor in th# craation of what waa to bacom# a dapandant 
#x%%rt-oriantad aconomy in Swastland.
Likawiaa, Danial haa arguad that though on a laaaar 
scala, tha Swazi axparianca waa sarkadXy alailar to that of 
Southam Bhcxiasia, in that it involved wholaaala land 
alienation, thua raaulting in both being aattlar atataa. The 
procaaa began in tha lasO'a. It waa facilitated by tha 
expropriation of two-thirda of Oia land aurfaca by tha 
colonial govanuBant for white aattlara {the 1907 Land 
Froolaaation), thua confining tha Swaai to 32 ao-callad 
'native araaa'; tha impoaition of a crippling tax burden; and 
penetration by both aattlar and multinational capital, of 
mainly Britiah and South African origin. Alan Booth haa argued 
that "the level of taxation of tha swaaia waa tha highaat in 
Anglophone Africa.*^
The expropriation of land produced local affecta in 
terme of the Swaai aocial formation. The moat viaible of tbaaa 
waa the creation of a cheap pool of la^ur, aa moat paaaanta, 
atrippW of their land, migrated to tha South African gold 
minaa to aaek an alternative source of livelihood. Thoaa who 
remained in tha country were forced into raaarvaa or became 
aguattera on the new European farma. Since the Europeans had 
taken control of tha bigger portion of tha land, these 
raaarvaa could hai^ly sustain tha murdi larger Swasi 
pc^lation, resulti;^ in extrema over-crowding and over­
grazing, among other problems. In thia regard, these policies
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bmâ W # n  «uccMsful in g#Mr#ting local ai^ migrant liütour to 
tha gold minaa, ooal minaa and farma of tha Tranavaal, thua 
fulfiling tha principal aim of tha Britiah.
Tha firm control which tha Swasi rulara axarciaad over 
tha swasi population alao proved uaaful In facilitating thia 
procaaa. In thia ragard, the swasi monarch played a big role 
in encouraging man to go to tha minaa in order to earn money 
for tha purchaaa of expropriated land. Ihia waa mainly 
facilitated by tha imposition of various taxes on hla 
subjects, a factor which forced a sizeable number of man to 
migrate to tha South African minaa to earn money to pay for 
these taxes. For axai^la, a labour recruiter in Swaziland la 
quoted in 1904 aa saying, ''I do not think I should be able to 
gat (tha Swazi) to come out unless they are influenced by tha 
Quean and tha chiefs."'^ Thia out-migration of man had other 
affects on tha Swazi aocial formation in tan» of tha sexual 
division of labour both within tha household and outside of 
it. Amongst others, tha nushar of famala-haadad households, 
esi»ciBlly in the rural areas, inonuiaed. Furtharrore, most of 
the woman whose husbands had migrated came to assume most of 
the responsibilities relating to agricultural prtxluction and 
other economic activities to meet their everyday family needs. 
The total impact of this 'double role* was an increased burden 
on the part of women, a feature that has largely remained this 
way to date.
Furthermore, the form of growth that took place during
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th* oeloni*! period w*e highly uneven. Capiteliet reeouroee 
t e M M  to favour eettler development in the form of roade and 
communication#, irrigation echeM#, agricultural loan# etc. 
However, Booth has argued that "since the better part of 
those fund# came from the 'Native tax', such development was 
in effect subsidised by the swasi,"'*
Such development also served to create structure# which 
ensured swasiland's continued dependence on the South African 
economy in the region. Sischoff observes how it soon 
transpired that capitalist donor states and capitalist 
investors were Interested in promoting Swasiland's orientation 
towards the South African economy and its domination of the 
sub-continent, since it was taking care of the organisation of 
economic activity in the region.'* This form of development 
did not allow for the realisation of indigenous or self- 
reliant alternatives, but instead promoted the creation of an 
economy highly dependent on South African and British 
capital(a). for exampls. Crush observes how "the incipient 
economy that was beii^ carved out of Swasiland cas» to rely 
heavily upon South African enterprises for marketii^ 
arrangements and transport facilities, and for st^plies of 
machinery and technical ex|»rtise,"'* % u s  Swasiland, until 
1964, remained reliant on the South African marketing boards 
for its principal products such as citrus, cotton and sugar. 
It was also heavily reliant on the South African railway 
transportation system, especially before the construction of
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its own railway lina in tha sama yaar. Bowavar, daapita this, 
Swasiland still ramsins largaly reliant on South African 
technical aaslatanoa.
The position and authority of tha Gvasi traditional 
rulers had baan in soma ways undansinad by tha colonial order, 
though tha colonial state had taken maasuras to liait tha 
extant of this erosion. ''At crucial stages, the state 
intervened to bolster tha hegemony of tha traditionalists over 
tha non-capitalist sector, An example is when in the 
1940's the British government gave the King a large cash grant 
to accelerate his pr^ramme of buying back the land of which 
the Swasis had been dispossessed. "Through such initiatives 
and its own efforts, the traditional ruling strata retained 
coherence and entered the immediate pre-independence period as 
the single most powerful indigenous group and the natural 
claimants to state power."’*
Thus, clearly from the outset, in Swaziland the pattern 
of economic growth was largely imposed from without. 
Inevitably, such growth, because of its highly exploitative 
and uneven nature could hardly benefit the masses of the Swasi 
people. For this early juried, Fair, Murdoch and Jones 
conclude
Alone with the introduction of the Swasi to wage 
earning, the traditional economy showed signs of 
modification a;^ weakening in other directions. 
Absenteeism of able-bodied men and serious imbalances 
in family and tribal organisation and productive 
capacity were imzvitable as the total isqpact of these 
events e^mpounded,’*
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% e  introduction of the Swazi# to wage earning during
this period, coWoined with the extremely open nature of the
economy that was being carved out, have had implications for
the type of workforce that has since developed in the country.
Winter has argued how the Swazi middle class, together with
the Swazi rulers, in a bid to attract foreign investment into
the country and also to accelerate their rate of accumulation,
have tended to favour low wages, since this meant more
investment. To achieve this end, the state used a number of
measures to ensure the availability of a reliable workforce
since this served both the interests of international and
local capital. Winter has further argued how the state,
through the National Industrial I^velopment Corporation of
Swaziland (HIDCS), used the drawing card of cheap labour in
its campaign to attract foreign investment as shown by the
following quotation from one of its pamphlets:
strike, absenteeism and other work stoppages that 
plague industry in many countries are virtually non­
existent in Swaziland. An ample labour force is 
available. Minimum salaries end wages apply only to 
the hotel industry and few others. There is little 
unionized labour... wa^s are modest by South African 
and European standards.®
Therefore, it is no coincidence that the state has 
exhibited an attitude of open hostility towards trade unions. 
King Sobhuza II, in a speech he made in 1972 **condemned the 
methods of the trade unions and said they were causes of 
industrial unrest through strikes... thus bringing the 
national industrial growth to a standstill. He said those who
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Buffered most from leaders who organized industrial strikes 
ware the poor man in the street."*^ Thus in 1973, following 
a series of strikes and industrial unrest which subsequently 
spread throughout the country, the King did not hesitate to 
seek the help of the British, who quickly sent in troops from 
Kenya to crush the strikes.
There have thus developed some corporatist tendencies 
between the Swazi state and foreign capital. These have come 
to govern the letter's attitude towards organized labour. An 
indication of this is underlined by how the Swazi state, in an 
alliance with foreign capital, created the Swazi National 
Council (SNC) after the 1963 strikes, an alternative 
institution to that of trade unions, in an attempt to weaken 
the powers of the latter, and to diffuse pressures for higher 
wages. To a large extent, the SNC, which soon became a highly 
bureaucratized and corrupt institution, did succeed in curbing 
the militancy of the trade union movement, thus achieving the 
aims of both the state and foreign capital. Since workers were 
deprived of an effective body through which to protest against 
low wages 2md poor working conditions, foreign companies 
investing in the country got away with paying starvation wages 
and maintaining poor working conditions.
From as early as the colonial period, Swaziland's foreign 
policy became moi^ oriented towards a capitalist path of 
development. This overall economic policy promoted investment 
and led to a rapid expansion of capitalist relations of
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production. Although the period iaosediatetly following
independence registered slow economic growth rates,*'between
1971 and 1976 the economy achieved high growth rates, the mean
growth rate over this period being 6% per annum. During the
second half of the 1970's, however, this growth rate fell to
2-3% per annum, but an upswing in the early 1980'e enabled the
growth rate between 1977 and 1982 to reach a mean of 5% per
annum.However, Sischoff observes that overseas investment
aid encouraged by the country’s capitalist path of development
did not, increase to the extent where Swaziland would Wcome
self-reliant or contemplate leaving 5ACU. On the contrary, the
corporations investing in Swaziland still relied on importing
through or from South Africa, rather than via Mozambique, "so
that greater monopoly investment in Swaziland's economy only
meant that the Swazi came to be more reliant than ever on
Swaziland's revenue from SACU."^
Sischoff sums it up when he argues that:
Therefore, it is clear that the colonial and settler 
order did not prepare Swaziland for political and 
economic autonomy. On the contrary, the issue of a 
possible transfer of the territory %%s kept alive 
long enough to retard the initiation of the 
decolonization process. The period covered was too 
brief and incomplete to allow for the building of a 
coherent political party and the proper z^bilization of 
substantial sections of the population. Neither did the 
colonial period make any provision for economic self- 
sufficiency, but promoted the building up of an export- 
oriented mining and agricultural econos^.^
Therefore, inde^julent Swaziland inherited an economy
deeply penetrated and controlIW by South African and British
capital. Over the years, the former has beco:^ the &)st
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dominant in the Swazi economy, whilst the latter dominates 
mainly the sugar industry. In a larger sense, independent 
Swaziland also came to reflect the close alliance that had 
been forged between the Swazi state and foreign capital. 
Hence, the dominant interests of the Swazi rulers and those of 
foreign capital came to dominate the Swazi soio-political and 
economic formation, a feature that has characterized 
Swaziland's political economy to date. Thus, Swaziland's 
foreign policy, especially since independence, has largely 
reflected these factors. In a larger sense, these have become 
the underlying imperatives of Swaziland's foreign policy 
position both in the region and in the wider global political 
economy.
3 Am Overview of swasi Domsstio And ^rsiga Policy Since 
Independence
3.1 Approaches to Swazi Foreign Policy
Most analysis of Swazi foreign policy especially in the 
1960's and 1970's has adopted the dependency approach. This 
has tended to focus on Swaziland's structural subordination to 
South African and international capital, emphasizing its land­
locked position and the transportation and trade consequences 
that flowed therefrom. These external forces were also
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presumed to have been largely responsible for Swazi political 
ami social formations.
Such a dependency framework of analysis was largely 
informed by the 'traditional power theory of international 
relations'» which associates power with foreign ^licy. Thus 
Swaziland was sii^ly assumed to be dependent upon and 
threatened by its more powerful neighbour» South Africa» hence 
its foreign policy was necessarily reflective of this 
dependence. Following from this» Swaziland was conceptualized 
as "a comprador state with a ruling class that is no mox% than 
a stooge of imperialism.**^
Under the dependency approach» the colonial state was 
conceived as an entity entirely subjected to external forces» 
with local forces lacking any degree of autonomy of 
action. However, as the dependency perspective slipped into 
s«me disrepute in the 1980* s» mainly due to changes in 
regional and global political econcmiies» tdiaracterized by 
destabilization in the former and structural adjustment in the 
latter, there emerged a correspoixiing shift to the analysis of 
Swazi foreign policy and its underlying causes.
More recent approaches, mainly using the political 
economy/ radical perspective, instead locals foreign policy 
within the nature of the powar structure in Swaziland, 
especially the interests and position of royalist
comprador class and its world-view. Such a relatively nuanced 
analysis captures the dynamics of contradiction and
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cooperation, claas and ideology at play in the making of 
foreign policy within the Swaai etate.
Furthermore, recent related approaches and d^atee have 
sought to situate Swazi foreign policy within the wider 
context of the New International Division of Labour (NIDL) and 
the New International Division of Power (NIDP), especially the 
whole question of structural adjustment and the demise of 
nonalignment respectively.
Such an analysis reveals, as Daniel has argued, that 
there has been a long historical continuity in the 
accomodationist posture adopted by the Swazi ruling class 
towards imperialist capital; that this relationship has been 
mutually beneficial, providing a satisfactory rate of 
accumulation for international capital, while ensuring, under 
colonialism, political survival and modest prosperity for the 
local royalists; and that, finally, the maturing crisis of the 
apartheid state constitutes likewise a crisis for the royalist 
class in Swaziland.^
3.2 Background to Swazi Domestic and Foreign 1^1icy.
As has already been mentioned, Swaziland is committed to 
a capitalist path of development, a factor which to a large 
ex^nt has shaped its ^mestic and foreign policy. Thus, by 
the time of independence, foreign capital hfwi come to dominate
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all ampact# of tha Swazi aconomy. Aa far back aa 1976, King
Sobhuza atatftd that
For my part, I have always recognized that external 
capital and skills play a very important part in tha 
development of the country's substantial natural 
resources? I am confident that tha entrepreneur will 
find in Swaziland praising opportu^tias and a highly 
satisfactory climats for investment.^
In 1985, tha then Prime Minister, Mrinca Bhekiapi, in an
interview with The Courjpr, reiterated tha same sentiments,
which is typical of most other African states, when he stated:
"Swaziland is committed to a system of free markets and
private enterprise. Government plays a relatively small role
in the economy, apart from ensuring a gowi investment
c l i m a t e . T h a  roots of Swaziland's pro-capitalist
orientation can be found in the historical process of state
formation and the dominant interests that came to prevail
during and after formal decolonization.
Therefore, Swazi domestic policy can be understwd within
tha context of tha interests and roles of three dominant
domestic groups; the Monarchy, European settlers and tha Swazi
petit bourgeiosie. At independence, all three major groups
vied for control of the state machinery.
The interests of the European settlers lay mainly in the
control of the land they had obtained following tha 1907 land
declaration, a position thay wanted to ratain aftar
indepandenca. Howavar, their interests clashed with those of
tha emerging Swazi petit borgeiosie, many of whom were
products of the elitist educational system which bad been an
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intc^al part of tha colonial syatoa. "Riarafore, in a wider 
sansa, colonial divisions axacarisat^ tansicms within Swasi 
society.
The Monarchy (which Bischoff calls "Dlamini
nationalism")whose powers had largely bean undermined
during the colonial period- but which had since won the most
important concessions, (that of mineral rights), out of which
the King set up the Tibiyo Takangwane fund- also wanted to
consolidate its power on the control of the state. Tibiyo has
since allied itself with foreign capital in numerous ventures,
especially the sugar industry, on which the country has become
increasingly dependent as the most important foreign exchange
earner. Seen in a wider context, Tibiyo has come to represent
the hegemony of the monarchy and its forged alliance with
foreign capital to reproduce the capitalist relations of
production in Swaziland. Thus, since 1968, the King has
governed with the loose consent of all social forces,
including that of the peasantry, former settlers and the
workii^ class. Bischoff argues that
such feudal relationships, consolidated with the 
assumption of supreme executive power by the King, had 
both internal and external meaning. To the outside 
world, it was meant to convey the picture of stability 
through a policy of traditionalism and continuing of 
the economic status quo. Internally, the dominance of 
the King in politics was to arrest the gMWth of any 
further political opposition and to make the monarchy, 
not national demaiuls, the focus of national unity to 
serve the interests of the few.^
Indeed, as Bischoff puts it, *'the objective needs of 
monopoly capital now dominating the economy, demanded greater
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linkag## at tha mapana# of any xora balancad
indiganoua grovth of tha forcaa of production.Thua,
at indapandanca,
the salarial intarasta of a monopoly dominant export 
enclave economy cas» to deciaively influence what 
Swasiland*a *national interest' waa to he in 
international relatione. Swazi foreign policy tharofoze 
case to reflect tee doainance of tela new'national 
intereat* and the aubjection of Dlamini nationalism to 
it.*
Swasi post-independence foreign policy haa reflected this 
close alliance between tee state and foreign capital. Thia has 
produced local effects in terms of the form of development 
that the country haa pursued, including the distribution of 
gains accruing therefrom, such capitalist develop^nt has 
tended to benefit tee few who control the state machinery, 
whilst the masses have become Increasingly marginalized.
3.3 Alliance With Foreign Capital;The Case of Tibiyo 
Takangwane.
Largely because of its wide and growing involvement in 
the econaay, Tibiyo has become a major defacto factor in 
Swaziland's foreign economic policy.
Tibiyo Takangwane ia a Royalist m»r|^ration, established 
by King Sobhuza II shortly before indsfwidence. It is the 
depository for all monies from mineral royalties. Among the 
uses made of Tibiyo funds has been the purchase of freehold
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land a# part of tha program to raator# it to Swaai control. 
Sine# than, Tibiyo haa adopts a policy of joint vanturaa and 
of acquiring aharaholdli^ra in othar aactora, notably agro­
industry, manufacturing, tourism and banking. Another 
davalopaant ainca 1976 haa baan tha transfer of mineral 
royalties to another body- Tisuka Takangwane- whose main 
purpose haa been to provide housing and acquire other 
invaatmenta for tha Swazi nation.
Tibiyo Takangwane haa been a subject of great 
controversy, mainly stashing from the secretive nature in 
which its affairs are operated. Its acccounts are neither 
audited nor open to public scrutiny. Its proceeds do not 
accrue to the Ministry of Finance. It la significant that tha 
income derived from these funds does not accrue to tha public 
treasury and that it is exempt from income tax and 
parliamentary audit. The King appoints the Board of Trustees 
of Tibiyo. yet, Alan Booth believes that "there is no 
question that Tibiyo brings great benefits to the people of 
SwazilaiwS."®
However, what has become increasingly obvious is that 
Tibiyo has not been able to stimulate indigenous development 
free of monopoly domination. Indeed, Daniel has argued that in 
fact, "Tibiyo has gro%m from a bank account into a royalist* 
controllW capitalist corporation operating as a junior 
partner in a growing and spreading alliens with multinational 
capital.
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Daniel further argue# that Tihiyo also exaaplifiea the 
dependent, neo-colonial strategy of capitalist development 
pursued in Svasiland. *'it is one which has deeply integrated 
the Swaei economy with the South African while producing 
dynamic local effects, particularly in terms of olaee 
transformation. As an organ of capital in general, Tibiyo has 
simultaneously served the interests of both international and 
national capital."®
In the swaei state's efforts to légitimité the activities 
of Tibiyo, the King was no less outspoken. In the words of the 
late King, ' 'Tibiyo is neither a competitor nor the duplicate 
of govermant's activities and programes but a complimentary 
organization to fill some gaps left behind by colonial rule 
and give a hand to the government in the great task of nation- 
building."®
In spite of this rationalitat ion, Tibiyo'# policies tend 
to clash with those of government, thus working against the 
national interest. While government agencies such as the 
HIDCS, have W e n  seen as tryiw to promote more labour- 
intensive job-creating activities, Tibiyo's policies have 
moved towards stressing capital-intensive projects. This has 
been particularly true in the case of sugar, which has been 
expanded at high capital cost to produce more than double the 
amount guaranteed by the US and the EC market. Fluctuations in 
the prices of sugar have meant that the rest must be sold on 
the world market at a substantial loss.
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For in r#o#nt y#ar#* the Sisunyo #wg#r o^qpXoK,
two-third# own#d jointly by Tibiyo and th# government ha# baan 
moving towards higher meohanimation in the imtaraet of 
baooaing more co^atitiva in the world market economy. This 
has baan happening in the face of high and growing 
unemployment in the country, with obvious consequences.
The power and influence which the royalist corporation 
has at its disposal may be seen by how one Swazi Prime 
Minister, Prince Mabandla, who attempted to critioise its 
policies was soon dismissed. Thus, it may be argued that by 
providing the monarchy with the necessary capitalist 
resources, Tibiyo has become a tool for the monarchy to 
reproduce itself, whilst maintaining its claim of working 
towards the common good. In this regard, Daniel has gone so 
far as to argue that "in classic Marxist terms, Tibiyo can be 
analysed as a comprador element, an intermediary between those 
vho exercise effective state power in Swaziland and foreign 
capital. Tibiyo<s activities to date have largely 
confirmed these assertions.
Thus it is clear that Tibiyo*# role in the Swaei economy 
has grown to have a decisive influence on the future 
development of the country. This is likely to make its lack of 
accountability a serious cause for concern in the future. 
Furthermore, there is already growing concern about both the 
relevance and commitment of some of its policies to the 
general development needs of the country. A more recent
49
i# that of tha Royal Svaii Airway# Corporation, in 
which Tibiyo haa a 50% aharaholding, and whi^ has baan 
oparating at a loaa in tha laat five yaara or mora. Daapita 
Buch loasaa, Royal Svaai Airvaya ia atill oparating, at high 
coat to tha taxpayar.
Furtharsora, though Swasiland baa not adoptad a formal 
atruotural adjuatsant programma, it ia claar that thara haa 
bean a cartain dagraa of raatructuring in certain aactora of 
tha economy. Thua, Tibiyo'a wide involv^ant in tha economy la 
likely to aaauaa even greater importance in thia regard. Among 
other thinga, ita move tewarda labour-aaving technology in tha 
face of high and growing unemployment may exacerbate tha 
already viaible effect a of adjuatmant. What la mora, with tha 
ooata of SAP in neighbouring South Africa already apilling 
over into Swasiland, Tibiyo'a policiaa would become even mora 
deoiaive for tha country'a future development. In tha 1990'a, 
with Bank and Fund comtitionalitiaa advancing orthodox 
development policiaa, Tibiyo ia likely to coma under 
incraaaing praaaura to adjuat towards more accountability in 
tha formulation and implementation of ita policiaa.
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4 Th# fest-8abbttift Ira
4.1 Doaastic strugglaa
Tha pracading argwnant indlcatas claarly tha natura and 
balança of svaai foraign and dosaatlo policy during tha 
Sobhusa IX ara, which covarad tha pra- and moat of tha poat- 
Indapandanca period.
King Sobhuea II had provided continuity in Swazi foraign 
policy apannlng nix dacadaa. Kla daath in 1982 laft a power 
vacuim which aaw different factiona of tha royal family and 
Btata bourgaioaia vying for control of atata power. Thia 
intanaa in-fighting warn largely over tha control of tha royal 
family itaalf, tha atata machinery, and tha royalty's riches 
held by tha Tibiyo fund. It waa further exacerbated by the 
long-atanding paralatent claims around a legitimacy dispute 
within tha royal family which dates back to tha controversial 
aalaction in 1900 of Sobhusa as a aucceaaor of King Bhunu* 
Thia ia aaid to have aplit the royal family into two factions, 
one loyal to tha sobhusa line and tha other to a lineage which 
la today headed by Prince Mfanaaibili.
Tha two factiona involved ware tha Mfanaaibili-Maibi 
faction, which waa eager to forge closer links with south 
Africa and tha Mabandla faction which waa mora cautious and 
mora vary of tha South African regime. Thua, it la im^rtant to 
note that there ware also external foraign policy aspects to
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this internal factionalism.
The dramatic events started with a palace coup whereby 
the Queen Regent Dzeliwe was ousted, stripped of the power to 
make the most important decisions, and Ntosbi La Tfwala 
(mother to the King) put in her place. Following that, the 
Hfanasibili-Hsibi faction, who were the two leading members of 
the liaooo (supreme council), consolidated its hold on the 
reins of power: "They took control of Tibiyo, passing a decree 
declaring their actions to be above the law.»** During tois 
period, Swazi relations with Pretoria improved substantially.
The dismissal of Mabandla in 1983 was very significant. 
Soon afterwards, the crackdown on the ANC increased, with 
bombings, kidnappings and assassinations carried out by the 
South African Defence Force, with the aid of the Swazi police. 
Swazi official relations with Pretoria improved substantially. 
It was during this period that the Swazi state sought to 
restate its historic claim to two pieces of land, Kangwane and 
Ngwavuma in South Africa, which if granted would afford 
Swaziland direct access to the sea. It had been Sobhuza's 
lifetime dream to see these two pieces of land returned to 
Swazi control. South Africa has taken advantage of this claim 
which it has been dangling as a carrot to win Swazi support in 
the region. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. R.V. 
Dlamini and Sishayi Nxumalo, were the two main characters 
pursuing the land deal negotiations.
The then Prime Minister, Prince Bhekimpi, justifying
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Swaei mietiona with South Africa, following tha opening of a
trade mission between the two countries, stated
The Swazi people have learned from the greatest 
authorities that if one is to become prosperous he 
should love his neighbours as he loves himself. 
Regardless of the differences of political Ideologies a 
pursued by your neighbour, you are expected to live 
peacefully. God made us neighbours and as such we have 
to love one another as neighbours,^
He went on to assert that Swaziland hid nothing in its
dealings with South Africa.
We work together on many issues. This is our way of 
life from time immemorial. I want to make it clear that 
we openly have dealings with South Africa. We do not do 
things clandestinely but carry out our affairs with 
South Africa in broad daylight. Today I want to make it 
clear that there is nothing wrong with our policy.^
Ihe intense factional fighting calmed down with the
coronation of the young King, Mswati III in 1986, who had just
returned from Britain where he had been studying. Meshers of
the Liqoqo have since taken their turns in jail.
Seen in a wider context, this period of intense strife
within the royal family may be said to be indicative of the
nature of the power structure and ideology of the Swazi ruling
class and its world-view, which share a lot in common with
that of South Africa.
The Liqoqo era clearly shows how Swaziland's foreign
policy position in the region is not only due to geopolitical
factors, or structural dependence, but also to the
compradorial nature of the Swazi ruling class, whose position,
interests and Ideology shares a lot in coismon with that of the
South African ruling class.
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Swaziland's foreign policy has thus baan raflactive of 
these two interrelated factors; i.a; tha ideological harmony 
of interests between the two ruling classes and tha structural 
integration of Swaziland's economy into that of South Africa. 
It is within these wide parameters that the South African 
regime has used a combination of carrot and stick to band the 
Swazi state to its own will. It must be n'ted, however, that, 
despite the mutual belief in the exercise of power and in 
capitalism, the Swazi state has never endorsed the racism 
inherent in the apartheid system.
Nevertheless, in the 1990's, the changing circumstances 
in the Southern African region, mainly characterized by the 
mounting pressure to oust the white minority regii^ in South 
Africa, may render Swaziland's middle-of-the- road position in 
its foreign policy increasingly harder to pursue and sustain.
4.2 Constraints and Contradictions
Swazi foreign policy and development initiatives in the 
regional context have been fraught with both constraints and 
contradictions, in large part, this reflects Swazilemd's 
conservative pragmatism in the conduct of its foreign policy. 
As the first Prime Minister of Swaziland, Prince Makhosini put 
it * 'Swaziland will follow an external policy based on 
realities with a maximim of acumen and a minimum of heroics;
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ba#*d on onlightonod ##ïf-int#r##t and r#f raining fros 
interfaranca in the affaire of other countriee. ***' Indeed, 
Swarilimd's post-independence foreign policy has largely 
reflected this conservative pragsratisa, a factor which has 
manifested itself in a number of its foreign policy 
initiatives in the region. However, in pursuing this ‘neutral* 
position, Swaziland has often found itself in a dilemma, 
resulting in contradictory foreign policy initiatives.
Swaziland's membership in both regional and continental 
organizations such as SADCC and the OAU has largely reflected 
the nature and extent of this dilemma. This is best 
demonstrated by Swaziland's position on the issue of 
sanctions against South Africa. At the QAQ Swaziland declared 
itself as opposed to apartheid, but made it clear that it 
could support a peaceful transition to majority rule and, 
under threat of sanctions from Pretoria, could not vote for 
sanctions against South Africa.
Furthermore, as a founder of SADCC, Swaziland is ideally 
committed to that organizatio's goals. Yet, because of its 
conservatism, Swaziland has found itself adopting a number of 
foreign policy initiatives which go against SADOI'b main 
objectives. Booth observes how in 1980, Swaziland's basic 
dilemma was highlighted following the construction of a rail 
linking to that of south Africa. Ihough this had the immediate 
advantage of allowing its eaqiorts an alternative route to 
Maputo, its larger implications were that Swaziland, a diarter
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member of SAD^, vae moving counter to the organisât ion's top 
priority of forging a trensportation network Independent of 
South Africa as a means of r^ucing dependency. ' 'That 
South Africa was aware of this politically subversive effect 
was confirmed during its assembly debate whi^ talked of the 
schemes for helping cement and improve relationships with 
Swaziland.
Thus, in an effort to balance its position in the region 
without alienating the south African regime, Swaziland has 
often found itself in a dilemma, resulting in contradictory 
foreign policy initiatives.
Other factors constraining Swazilaiui's development 
efforts and general foreign policy have been ecological, over 
«rtiich of course the country has very little control. In 1984, 
the country was hit by a severe cyclone- Domonia- which 
destroyed a large fraction of the infrastructure, and cost the 
government millions of emalangeni to rebuild. The country has 
also experienced some serious drought periods, especially over 
the last ten years, resulting in heavy reliance on ^ain/food 
i^jorts, mainly from South Africa. The foreign policy 
implications for a country reliant on the importation of its 
basic foodstuffs, in this case grain, are obvious.
What is more, the current persistent drought that has bit 
the whole region this year is likely to aggravate the 
situation. South Africa and Zimbabwe, the two main countries 
from which Swaziland isgjorts grain have also been hard hit. In
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addition, thaa# drought spalls bava aggravatad tha fragile 
nature of Swaziland's agro-industrial sector, on whl^ it is 
highly dependent- sugar, wood-pulp, citrus fruits and pine­
apples- all of which are prone to drought and dependent on 
trade. In sum, though some of the factors constraining 
Swaziland's foreign policy are beyond its control, its 
conservatism would sees to account for part of its foreign 
policy initiatives in the region, thus giving more credence to 
the ideological element between the two ruling classes.
4.3 Relative Autonomy
However, these constraints do not constitute the whole 
explanation for any understanding of Swazi foreign policy 
imperatives. As already argued, the roots of Swazi foreign 
policy lie in the nature of the power structure and 
ideological world view of its ruling class. These would reveal 
that, in spite of existing constraints, there is some room for 
independent foreign policy decision making.
Swaziland's potential for relative autonomy in its 
foreign policy in the region can be demonstrated by the 
Premiership of Prince Mabandla between 1979 and 1983. During 
this period, Swaziland made attezqpts to reduce its links and 
distance itself from the apartheid regime, to lessen its
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économie dependence upon the regime and to align itself more 
with the Front Line States (FIS) in the region.
Following from this, in February 19S2, the Prime 
Minister's office issued an 'Economic Review* which stated 
"There is a declared policy by the government of swaeiland to 
lessen dependence on the Republic of South Africa.”̂  In 
order to implement this policy, the Swasiland government 
embarked on the construction of a E40K h^ro-electricity 
generating station which doubled Swazi capacity. Under the 
same plan, another project was effected: the installation of 
an earth station for satellite telecommunication links, which 
immediately rid Swaziland of both the risk of having its 
telephone traffic pass through South Africa and the expense of 
the axhoibitant rates charged by South Africa.
Interestingly, "this occurred at a time when the regional 
power balance appeared to be shifting away from South Africa, 
whilst socialist states were emerging in the region,"** 
Whether that was a coincidence or a wall-planned aW-  
orchsstrated strategy by Mabandla *s government remains quite 
debatable. What remains clear, however, is that he had been 
strongly opiwsed to the land deal which South Africa had been 
dangling as a carrot to win Swazi support in the region, and 
had not been particularly enthusiastic about forging close 
links with the South African regime. By contrast, Mabandla*s 
successor, Prince Bhekimpi was a staunch supporter of the land 
deal negotiations.
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It is Ro coinciâancs then that it vas during MabaMla's 
prsaiership that Swaziland joined SADCC ami rajacted South 
Africa's overtures to join CONSAS. Its relations with the 
socialist states, notably Mozambique, improved, "with the 
subsequent detention of a number of MMR men and the 
deportation of several people who had been involved in 
recruiting Mozambicans working in Swaziland to send to MNR 
training camps in South Africa.**’ Swazi relations with the 
ANC also improved substantially during this period.
One of the most significant events in this anti- 
dependency period was the meeting of 6 April 1981, when 
Mabandla hosted the late President Macbel of Mozambique, 
Botswana President Quett Masire, and Leabua Jonathan, who was 
then Lesotho Prime Minister. "The meeting, probably wique in 
Swazi history, issued a communique sharply critical of 
attempts by South Africa to destabilize her neigbhouring 
Black-ruled states."**
% i s  period also witnessed a number of other significant 
strategies which Swaziland adopted in an attempt to try to 
lessen its dependency and ties with South Africa. For example, 
it is notable how in 1980, Swaziland used the threat of 
cholera in South Africa to ban the import of fruit and 
vegetable.
Booth observes how Swaziland, by prolonging the ban until 
1984, used it to its advantage, ^irough this a»asure, it was 
able to boost local production by creating a protected market
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for fruit and vayatabl## and to força South hfrican>owrwd 
wholasale and retail trader# to eatabliah Swaai aourcea of 
aupply.
However, ''Swaziland, after all these efforts, slipped 
back into South Africa's orbit iAen it signed a secret 
security agressent with Pretoria on 17 February 1982,*^ a 
poorly calculated move by Mabandla*s government. In a larger 
sense, this was also a reflection of the contradictions 
inherent in Swaei foreign policy- making in the region. With 
South Africa's 'total strategy* at its peak, the Swaei state 
saw it in its best interest to win the South African regime 
over to its side in the hope of avoiding confrontation with 
it. However, it seems to be no coincidence that soon after the 
signing of the secret agreement. South Africa dropped the land 
deal negotiations. At that time, South Africa referred the 
Swazi government to the respective Bantustan leaders, who were 
adamantly opposed to the land transfer, for further 
negotiations. The Swazi state's attempt to pursue such 
negotiations with the Bantustan leaders met with blatant 
opposition from those leaders. The issue has not been raised 
by either parties since then, but Swaziland may restate its 
claim after a majority-ruled govenusent comes t power in 
South Africa, a factor which might bring it into sharp 
conflict with the new government.
Thus, in a wider sense, the difference between Mabandla's 
and Bheklapi's premiership# also point to the the fact that
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In the imperial i#t contaxt of Southern Africa the» a »  
option# and dagree# of atdjmiesiveiwse and 
collaboration, and that économie domination and 
o»rcion a# well a# the uee of threat of military 
power, ehould not be eeen a# the aole dete»inante of 
the regional »latione with the govern»nt of South 
Africa and the liberation forces opposing it.**
Thus, contrary to popular belief, the Mabandla era proves
Swasilaiui*# relative autonomy in the conduct of its foreign
policy. The diffe»nces in ideological outlwk between
Mabandla and Bhekimpi is a further indication that ideology
has been, and continues to be, a central featu» in the
understanding of Swazi fo»ign policy initiatives in the
region, despite real existing constraints.
5 The Mswati III Brat Challenges of The ifso's
The changes that have occurred in both the regional and 
global political economies, beginning from the latter part of 
the 1980*5- from destabilization to transition towards 
majority rule in South Africa and the end of the Cold War- are 
likely to have implications for Swaziland*s political economy 
in the 1990's and beyond. Daniel as^es that "the current 
political evwits in the r^ion are deepening the ties between 
Swaziland and south Africa, so that Wie »lationship has 
becM* an embrace of two threatewd ruling classes.'*^ This 
say be demonstrated by South African P»sident, F.tf de Klerk's 
brief visit to Swaziland on his way to Kenya in June last
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year. Tha Econoatat Inf lliaanoa Unit raport# that Nr. da 
Xlark ' 'touchad down in Swaziland to a rad oari^t 
Shaking about South Afrioan-Swazi ralati)na, da mark 
referred to these as ' 'always having been close and friendly, 
Woause both countries shared a common destiny in a sub­
continent which demands pragmatic and realistic policies."*' 
In response, King Mswati referred to da Klerk as " a  man of 
destiny in whom the salvation of South Africa lies."**
In the 1990's, Swaziland has started eaperiancii^ what 
appear to be spill-over effects from the changes and calls for 
multi-party democracy taking place in South Africa in 
particular, and in most parts of Eastern Europe and the whole 
African continent in general. In the last two years, there has 
been growing discontent with the present form of government, 
especially among the youth and university students, 
culminating in the formation of an underground political 
party. Hie People's Democratic Movement (PUOSfO), calling for 
multiparty democracy.
PUDEMO has since come out to openly challenge the 
monarchy and the present system of government. That the Mwly 
formed Swaziland Youth Organization (SffAYOCO), has been 
particularly outspoken in condemning the present system is 
also a sign of the growing discontent. It also points to the 
re-activation of some sections of civil society in the 
Kingdom, in this case the youth, some of whom are university 
graduates. What is more, "the opposition of ^iefs to the
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Tinkhundla atill #%i#t#, and in Nay 1969 about 40 ohiafa 
advocatad tha raplaoaaant of tha praaant alaotoral ayatni. 
% a y  favoured tha introduction of a syatea of direct alactions 
to parliaaant."^
Tha high incidanca of induatrial atriXa action in tha 
paat two yaaraf and tha aaoalation of atudant unraat points 
to%rarda ttim aama direction, k new trade union federation has 
baan astablishad to challenge tha hagimony of tha swaailami 
Federation of Trade Unions (5FTU), kwown as tha Congress of 
Swaailand Trade Unions (CMWATU). According to local news 
reports, ' 'œSNATU believes that tha SFTU is too conservative 
and toothless to represent effectively the interests of the 
workers."^ The new federation has applied to the Department 
of Labour for registration. However, after about a year, its 
application is still being 'considered*, according to the 
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Joshua Kndrebele. However, 
Nndzebele went on to hint tiiat the possible reason for the 
delay may be that some assure of the organisation have been 
linked to political organizations.
In recent years, labour unrest spread to brewery and 
plantation workers and to the public service sector. Of 
particular note was the successful nation-wide bank strike 
(despite iMiing economically counter-productive) called by the 
Banker's union in August 1991 which, for three days, brought 
the whole country to a halt until the workers' demands were 
met. Unrest also erupted among university students, resultii^)
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in th« olosur* of tft« Univoralty for poriod# of up to on# 
month in lot# 1930.
In July 1989, in m ovift mov#, th# King diuti»^ th# 
Prim# Mlni#t#r Sotmha Dlamini for what h# t#rs#d 
'di#ob#di#n^'. In him plac# was appointed Ob#d Dlamini, a 
founder member and former Seox^tary General of the SwaailaM 
Federation of Trade Union#. It i# widely believed that 
Dlamini*e appointment was expected to calm the growing 
discontent on the labour frtmt, which had led to strikes in 
the banking and transport systems. % i s  move constitutes part 
of the cof^tation strategy that the monarch has adopted in 
trying to deal with demands from the masses.
However, contrary to what the state had hopsd to achieve 
by appointing Dbed to the premiership, he has since been seen 
by the authorities to act sympathetically towards Uie forces 
calling for democracy in the Kingdom. The Sunday Times of 
Swaziland reported that "the PM, it was widely understood, 
stood close to the end of his political career, follMfing the 
storm raised by his decision to allow a controversial fund­
raising march by SHkïOCO, for which, it is said, the 
traditionalists wanted his head.*"
After this fund-raising march had been amwunced the 
police had felt sufficiently challenged to threaten to arrest 
everybody in it. But two days before, the Prime Minister 
appeared on television and announced that the government would 
not stop it. His action, though i^pular among the youth and
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oth«r Mdioml warn oonaidarad to L* highly suhvarsiva
within oonaarvativa circlaa. Imaadiataly following that, thara 
wara paraiatant ruacura that tha ^ima Miniatar would aoon ha 
diaoiaaad frra offica, preaumably for 'diaobadianca*; as waa 
hia pradacaaaor.
But "baoauaa tha daoiaion by tha RN waa widely hallW 
at ho&a and abroad aa oorract and in keeping with the apirit 
of tha damocratlaation prooaaa, tha threat by tha 
conaarvativaa had to be carried out with cara."^ of tha 
period following this incident, tha Sunday Tiaas of Swaziland 
reported that ' 'thus began in aamaat one of tha fiercest 
public lobbies to unseat tha M  free hia offica. Tha head of 
tha Tinkhundla, Mndani Shabalala, waa reputed among tha 
leaders of tha ^*s critica.**^
In tha light of this mass discontent, which has become a 
pr(minant feature of Swazi society in recent years, the Swazi 
ruling class has sought ways of making soma concessions to tha 
massas. Such efforts have baan mainly directed towards 
reforming tha Tinkhundla electoral system, which has been the 
main target of criticism by all sections of tha Swazi 
population, and to quiet discontent on tha labour front.
However, PUDEMO, which has increasingly assumed tha role 
of representing tha forces calling for multi-party democracy 
in tha country, views tha Tinkhundla system of govammant as 
''an undemocratic traditional establishment lacking tha 
mandate of the people."* According to PUDEMO, "its
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legitimacy is therefore highly questionable. For this reason, 
it has therefore no business in the transitional pwcess 
towards democracy and should just relinquish power to an 
interim government elected by the national convention."*’
The monarch has made attempts to justify the p’̂ aent 
system of government as one that is representative of the 
wishes of the Swazi nation. Speaking at his 21st birthday 
celebrations in April 1989, King Mswati stated that 
''political stability in the Kingdom would best be achieved 
through the Tinkhundla, which provide the vehicle of 'unity 
and democracy* in the Kingdom."*® This is a clear indication 
that "the King presently views the Tinkhundla as constituting 
a key basis for the development of the Swazi nation on the 
basis of tradition."*^
The head cf the Tinkhundla, Hndeni Sha'̂ .̂̂ ala, in his 
concluding remarks at a conference on local authorities, 
further reiterated the same sentiments when he asserted 
"Swaziland is a Kingdom strongly pivoted on the unshakable 
Tinkhundla system of government."** In an attempt to dissuade 
the youth, which he perceives to have been the most persuaded 
by PUDEMO's ideas, Mndeni warned parents to "protect their 
children against the Influence of PUDEMO which aimed to 
undermine the unique method of democracy in Swaziland through 
which the monarch and his subjects com# together to share 
responsibility in running the socio-economic and political 
affairs of the country."**
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However, contrary to the long-held view that the maes of 
the population (especially the peasantry) are content with the 
present form of government, PUDEMO states "the silence of the 
people should not be misconstrued as a sign of approval. It is 
due to fear, intimidation and insecurity instilled by the 
ongoing state of emergency."**
However, despite these attempts to justify and preserve 
the Tinkhundla system, the appointment by the King of a 
Tinkhundla Review Committee in September 1991 constitutes one 
attempt by the state to make concessions to the people. Yet, 
it is interesting to note how, within a few weeks of its 
appointment, the committee had degenerated into what has been 
popularly called the 'Vusela Committee*,* i.e an instrument of 
cooptation rather than reform, in order to appease the Swazis. 
This development may not be surprising when considering who 
the members of the committee were and whose interests they 
are likely to represent. A report in the Sunday Times of 
Swaziland hinted that the con^sition of the committee was 
questionable and ' 'contained seasoned politicians who say well 
make changes that will please certain people in authority, 
rather than constitutional experts who would take seriously 
the task of constitutional reform."** Indeed, the cwamittee 
was only comprised of conservative members of the defunct 
Imbokodvo National Movmnent and royalists, and was headed by 
one of the most conservative politicians. Prince Masitsela.
This move by the King elicited a sharp reaction from the
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opposition, notably, PUDEHO, In response, in a letter to the
King dated 29 November 1991, RJDEMO registered concern about
what it calls "the static political position maintained by
the swasi government in a changit^ world. The letter
states "We are gravely concerned, as advocates for a just and
democratic system, to note that your government has not been
moved an inch by the tide of change experienced by our beloved
continent."*^ It further demands the "upllftment of the
state of emergency and the withdrawal of all repressive
legislation in Swasiland.*•“  Of the review of the
Tinkhundla system by a committee appointed by the King earlier
in the year WDEMO states:
Instead, your government has decided to embark upon a 
bogus consultation exercise aimed at throwing dust into 
the eyes of the people. We would like to point out that 
we are neither amused nor lured into believing that 
this exercise was directed at addressing the 
fundamental core of the political problems of our 
country.*’
Despite this open challenge, the monarch has persisted in
its claim of acting in the best interest of the Swazi people.
In a speech honoring the visit of the elected HMD President
Chiluba of Zambia early this year, the King pronounced that
* *his government is not resisting change. With interesting
caution, he added
Your excellency is obviously aware that our world is 
presently experiencing momentus changes. As such, we in 
Swaziland have decided to adjust ourselves to the 
challenges of change but not as followers of global 
pattern, but because we feel the time is right for us b 
review our political system in accordance with the 
aspirations of the people."^ (my emphasis)
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Daspita thia spaach, it vaa aoon aftar%rartia that tha
King, in an apparent move to atifla change towards multiparty
politics, announced another Vusela committee (since known as
Vusela XI). It is not clear what the necessity or duties of
this second committee would he. However, what is both clear
and interesting is how the meid^ership of the second committee
underlines the state's atteint at coopting some of the radical
elements which it views as *a threat* to it . some of the
members of the second committee include the general secretary
of the Swaziland's Human Rights Association (HUMARAS), which,
though another- recently formed organization, is seen by the
state as a potential threat, and a certain lawyer who has been
a staunch critic of the Tinkhundla system of government. The
rest are conservative chiefs.
Of the second committee, PUDEMO states;
It is a waste of time and resources to try to resist 
change. In the long run, such resistance will have a 
serious impact upon the development process of our 
country for which your government will be held 
responsible. The change called for by the people of 
Swaziland is a global process that is irreversible.^
The position which the i^narch has adopted towards the
forces seeking change has led many observers to doubt the
*declared' intentions by Mswati and his advisors towards
confronting the central political and administrative problems
facing the country. This has cast further doubt on the extent
to which the next round of 'no party* elections due in
November 1992 would prove useful towards meeting these growing
internal demands.
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In conclusion, as Maasdorp sums up:
•Ihm economic history of Swasiland is cdiaracterisad by 
the persistance of many of the features of the pre- 
colonial economy mentioned earl1erf the incorporation t 
the Svasi into the money economy: the wintanance of 
political power into the hands of the traditional 
elite, the close relationship forged by the elite with 
foreign capital and its encouragement of foreign 
investment and economic growth.^
However, as has been argued, certain changes that have 
occurred both at the gl̂ EHil, continental and even local levels 
call for an analysis that captures the dynamics of these 
changes and their likely impact on the Swazi socio-economic 
and political formations.
Seen in a wider context, these changes are a reflection 
of a gl:^l trend. It remains to be seen how the Swazi state 
and monarch will deal with these challenges in this 
changing r^ional and global environments, and how they will 
try to meet the needs of the internal groups demanding change. 
Strategies that worked for King Sobhuza 11 in the 1960*s and 
1970's- those of usii^ the traditional structure as the 
legitimate base for the power of the monarchy- are becoming 
increasingly diffioilt to maintain, since the world of the 
1990*8 is markedly different from that of the 1960*s. Thus, 
the Swazi state may yet need to adopt new tools and seek new 
solutions to the problems and challenges facing the country. 
In the face of these increasing pressures, the Swazi state 
might be forced to continue with reform and negotiation with 
the forces seeking a change of government, a prwess which 
might be slow and protracted, yet inevitable.
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C b i ^ t a r  3  m  B M I Q H M t .  g g L I I X M  . l g « l K M I . t  
1 % #  StrUOtttTAS of DOpOBdUOO
Swaziland's political economy has been linked to that of 
the region through different institutions since as far hack as 
the last century. Its integration into the wgional political 
economy has had a continued iz^act on its develoinaent ami 
general foreign policy, and is likely to continue to do so in 
the future. However, sucdi regional ties have not been 
unchanging, but rather have responded to shifts and 
transformations at both the regional and global levels. As 
Shaw argues that ' *as regional and global technologies and 
demands changed,- labour for mines and farms, metals and 
materials for new industries and now water and enengy for 
sustained production... regional relationships thus reflect 
both global changes and national fortunes; domestic class 
formations and relations are Inseparable from external 
technologies, strategic and economic directions.**^ At the 
more global level, "structural adjustment impacts upon the 
region's relatively euivantaged «uid industrialized leaders like 
South Africa and Zimbidwe as well as upon its small states.**̂  
Clearly, Swaziland's political economy has been affected by 




Swasiland haa baan a mambar of the Southam Africa 
Custoas Union (SACU) Agreement since it was formed in 1910. 
The costs and benefits of it membership in the SACU agreement 
have been a matter of serious debate, which has still not been 
resolved. Though Swasiland obtains more than half of its total 
state revenue from SACU, and imports about 90% of its goods 
from South Africa, all of which enter duty-free, the question 
still remains as to whether these benefits are trorth the loss 
of autonomy that the aesbership entails. Maasdorp has argued 
that one unguantifiable advantage derived is that brantaws of 
South African firms in Swaziland are subject to the same 
management controls as their head office, and these are 
facilitated by the free flow of goods in terms of the SACU 
agreement and funds in terms of the CMA agreement which have 
ensured that shops are well stwked.^ In this respect, he 
observes that "Swaziland, together with Botswai^ and lesotho, 
is the envy of other Southern African countries."*
However, what has become increasingly apparent is that 
South Africa has tended to use the SACU to reward or punish 
the 615 countries as it deems fit. Furthermore, South Africa, 
although obliged to consult the smaller countries, retains 
the *'right to determine the customs* excise ami sales duty 
tariffs, and in fact does so in its own interest.”’ In 
addition, in spite of the agreement's provision*; for the 'free
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interchange of good»', it has b**n widely argued that South
Africa has prevented the establishment of industries in the
smaller cwintries that it feared irauld provide unwanted
competition. As J.S Crush puts it in a nutshell with specific
refsMnce to Swaziland:
It has been argued that the 1969 agreement fails to 
tackle the problems of polarization consequent upon 
Swaziland's peripheral location and dependent economic 
structure: that it did not change the ground rules 
concerning the freedom of movement of goods: that South 
African monopolistic industry has retained the right to 
protect itself against competition: and that South
African importation controls have had a depressing 
effect on potential revenue for Swaziland.*
That Swaziland's membership in the SACU has placed
constraints on its plans for industrialization became clear in
the early 1980's when it was contemplating establishing a
fertilizer factory to supply the region. It was forced to
postpone its plans following South Africa's announcement that
it would not purchase the prcduct. Though Swaziland later went
ahead with the plan, its fertilizer factory scon collapsed in
the face of cosgwtition frœa south African fertilizer firms.
It must be noted though that the drought that hit the southern
African region in the early 1980's was another contributing
factor to the subsequent failure of the Swaziland fertilizer
factory.
Selwyn (1975) argues that the BLS countries pzasent an 
extrmze case of polarization in view of their weakness vis-a- 
vis South Africa. He identifies several reasons which make it 
difficult for them to attract industry. In the case of
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Swaziland, them# Includa high tran*]»rtation costs, th# 
of^nsss of its markst to South African products and its 
dapendanca on foreign capital, entarprisss and managamant/
Thus, many writers have argued that Swaziland's 
membership in SACU, though beneficial in soma respects, has 
had a largely negative li^ct on its plans for 
industrialization. This became nor# evident in the 1970's, a 
period which saw Swaziland launch a policy of 
industrialization, the intention being to achieve some measiure 
of self-sufficiency. However, as it turned out, such a j^licy 
could not be fully implemented since Swaziland's membership in 
SACU and its continué reliance on attracting overseas and 
also South African-based capital presented a contradiction 
which worked against the realization of this objective. Seen 
in a wider context, these constraints and contradictions are 
a reflection of the dilemma which small dependent states such 
as Swaziland encounter in the pursuit of their develo|xaent in 
a world that is characterized by relations of centrs-periphery 
at global as well as regional levels.
Thus, Swaziland's attempts to develop a more diversified 
capitalist-oriented economy has been confronted with these and 
other problems, in a wider sense, its memberxAip in the SACU 
agreement has largely served to maintain the existi:^ division 
of labour between itself and its trading partner. South 
Africa; i.e its export of raw materials and import of 
manufactures.
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In this regard, both regional and glt^l ehifte and 
transforsations have impacted directly on Swazil&M'e 
|H>litical economy ae on other developcountries. In the 
case of the former, these have manifested themselves in 
Swaziland's continued dependence on South Africa, the 
relatively more developed partner in the region. However, such 
depeiulence and its resultant effects have profound 
implications for Swaziland, especially given the NIDL within 
the wider context of the global political economy.
1.2 Ihe Common Monetary Area Agreement (RMA/CMAJ
Swaziland has been a member of the Rand Monetary Area 
Agreement (RMA) [since changed to Common Monetary Agreement] 
since 1910. Its incorporation into the RHA pegs the value of 
the Swazi currency flilangeni) since the mid-1980*s to the 
rand, meaning that effKtive control of the Kingdom's monetary 
policy is partly in the hands of South Africa, by far the 
largest partner. However, though the rand ceased to be l^al 
tender in the Kingdom following the trilateral monetary 
agreement of July 1986 between South Africa, Swaziland and 
Lesotho, rand notes still circulate freely in the country and 
banks continue to accept them for credit of their custome»' 
accounts. However, despite the official de-linking, the Swazi 
lilangeni in fact still remains at parity with the rand. Ihis 
has had various effects on the Swazi economy, amongst which
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ar# that **Swaclland Import# Inflation (now running at 13-15% 
par annum) and that th# country • a debt aarvica payment# bava 
incraaaed,** in part a function of South Africa*# own aconoaio 
and debt crises.
Thu#, a# sooth has argued, though Swaziland'# 
incorporation into the SKA hold# many of the advantage# that 
have ]^en proclaimed by others, it needs to be judged whether 
the costs to Swaziland'a economy- i.e the lose of autonomy and 
creation of dependency- are worth any gains. Swaziland 
continue# to suffer all th# economic disadvantages of monetary 
integration. In 1971, such danger# becuse clear to the BLS 
countries. South Africa, In response to a drop In the gold 
price on top of some oOier increases in the cost of it# 
principal imports, tightened up bank credit over the entire 
monetary area. The 1980's saw a repeat experience following 
the severe economic crisis and balance of payments problems 
that the country was experiencing. In both caees, this had the 
effect of slowing down all development projects in the BLS 
that depended on bank credit. What is more, in 1971, when 
South Africa devalued its rand, "the BLS authorities heard 
about it first through the radio and newspapers."^ The effects 
of such monetary integration have been a source for concern 
aawng Swazi leaders, though they have consistently expressed 
their inability to do anything about it. This became more 
evident in the early-1980's, a period which saw rapid 
inflation in South Africa, which subsequently spilled-over to
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th# Svaci #oon«By, resulting In #kyrocK#ting prie## #v#n for 
th# Btost haslo cosBOditi##. Th# Svatl Nini#t#r of Finano# wa# 
r#i»rt#d as saying "So long as swasilaM is a mssAsr of th# 
SACU and RMA, policy options to limit inflation ar# sevarsly 
limitad,*’®
Othsr disadvantagas of such monoLory intagration to 
Svasiland's aconomy pertain to intarast paymant, which is 
datarminad by tha axtant to which rands circulât# in its 
aconomy. Claarly, tha costs of adjustsant in South Africa and 
thair spill'ovar affacts hava had a largely negative ii^aot on 
tha Swasi economy which in itself was enjoying relative 
stability during this period. It has also not proved possible, 
with a pegged currency, for the Kingdom to effectively control 
tha outflow of capital to South Africa, its main foreign 
investor. *'Continued domination of its banking system by 
foreign enterprises with heavy commitments in South Africa- 
Barelays and Standard Banks particularly does nothing to ease 
the pr(*lam of capital outflow.""
Furthermore, fiscal domination by South Africa and the 
free flow of funds within the rand area permits easy 
repatriation of profits from Swasiland. Though this is good 
for interest payment, the total effect is that membership in 
RKA has meant that swasiland is unable to control those 
monetary policies which affect its economy .
The fors»r Swasi Minister of CoasMrce, Industry and 
%urlsm Derek Von Wissel explained this situation in these
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term#
One muet reellce that in every tihre of swaai eooiety 
there is a dominance of the South African experience, 
south Africa determines our wages* south Africa 
determines our investment policy* South Africa 
determines our fiscal policy* South Africa determines 
our monetary policy. We are so dt^insted by South 
Africa that we have little manwuvrability. "
Although the Minister's ending note in the above
statement may seem slightly exaggerated, it is quite a{^»arent
that Svasiland's memberships in the CMA Agreement and the SACO
do indeed limit its control of those important j^licy
decisions and initiatives that most affect its economy.
Furthermore, its monetary integration through the C3CA has laid
it vulnerable to the spill-over costs of SAP in south Africa,
a factor which has had a largely negative impact on its
development prospects in recent years.
1.3 Migrant Labour
"Swasiland, along with Botswana and Lesotho has been 
incorporated into the South Africa's labour 'catchsmnt area' 
for the better part of the century.”'̂ The loss of its most 
productive resource, its young men, has had various effects on 
the Swasi social formation and productivity in the homestead. 
Its total impact has been low homestead productivity* 
increased poverty and malnutrition* and the high incidence of 
female-headed households.
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As coB^rsd to other wimtrl## in the region, Sweiilei^ 
oontrlbutee e email percentage of worker# to South Africa's 
gold mining industry. However, "since Swasiland has the 
ssallsst population of the countries in the region, the 15-
20,000 workers it sends to the mines annually represent 36% of 
Swag Hand's able-bodied male labour force and about 4% of the 
total minii^r labour force in South Africa for the year 
1986."" Therefore, though in absolute terms Swaziland 
contributed fewer men to the South African gold mines over the 
years, as a percentage of the male population, its loss was 
similar to that of Botswana. However, their loss cannot be 
equated to that of Lesotho which has over 40% of its working 
population employed in South Africa,
"At its peak in the late-1970's, Swaziland supplied 28 
000 miners. The present figure is around 10 000."" However, 
added to that figure is a sizeable nmber of Swazis working as 
migrants on Eastern Transvaal farms. In recent years, there 
has also been an increasing flow of informal migration of 
Swazis in other skilled areas, in search of so-called 'greener 
pastures'. These include teachers, engineers, university 
lecturers, technicians etc. This has since further increased 
the migrant outflow as professionals take their families with 
thn, whereas workers cannot.
One ther form of such Informal cross-border traffic also 
incltuiss %romen in the informal sector. In recent decades, one 
of the most lucrative businesses, especially for lower-middle
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cXsss women in Swaziland has been the hawking business. This 
involves women hawkers who buy clothes and other comm^ities 
in South Africa at relatively cheaper prices to resell in 
Swaziland at a profit.
However, low-income women have also been able to 
penetrate the infor.u&l lector trade, mainly selling 
handicrafts in South Africa. Their main customers within 
Swaziland itself are the tourists, most of whom are South 
African vacationers. This informal cross-border trading has 
become an important aspect of regional relations? women from 
other neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe are also 
involved.
However, what has become apparent over the years is the 
way south Africa has used the migrant labour dependence of 
these countries to reward friends and punish enemies. South 
Africa, through its official recruiting agency has been known 
to cut down on the number of migrants as a way to coerce 
compliance from these states.
However, though the migrant labour system, despite these 
problems, has helped to alleviate the unemployment problems of 
the neighbouring countries, trends and develc^ments since the 
beginning of the 1970's have compound^ and served to further 
complicate the issue of migrant labour in the region. The 
economic elements are two-fold. First, since the late 1970's, 
the South African gold mining industry has been moving towards 
higher mechanization, a venture which was facilitated by the
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windfall profits derived followin'? the rise in the price of 
gold in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Viewed within a 
wider context, this development may be said to be also an 
aspect of the NIDL in terms of improved technology transfer, 
from the developed to the developing %rorld. As a result, since 
the late-1970's the modern mines have begun hiring fewer but 
more skilled miners. "Wages have i.icreased dramatically and 
a bonus system encourages repeated contract renewals for 
skilled miners. So, gold has become a lucrative career for a 
select group, but this has meant smaller numbers entering the 
migrant stream,"’* a factor which is creating a labour 
aristocracy in the mining industry.
However, since the late 1980*s, the price of gold has 
declined, precipitating an economic crisis resulting in 
massive cutbacks on production and employment, with obvious 
consequences to these countries.
Clearly, the issue of migrant labour is one that will 
remain an important factor in the regional political economy 
into the twenty-first century, as will be discussed on the 
section on post-apartheid scenarios. The move towards higher 
mechanization in the South African gold mining industry 
)̂ .ttails serious implications for the neighouring states in the 
region which have been dependent on the migrant labour system 
to alleviate their unemployment problems.
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1.4 Tourism
Swaziland's tourist industry was not davslopad until th# 
late-19&0's. h huge influx of foreign capital, mainly of 
British and South African origin was involved in its 
development. To date, ''South Africa's Sun International 
dominates the Industry through its local subsidiary Swasi Spa 
holdings, in which Tibiyo holds a 39% stake.
The Swazi tourist industry grew dramatically in the post­
independence period. For example, "the tourist inflow rose 
fiom 10,000 per annum during the early 1960's to over 40,000 
in the first year of independence; thereafter there was an 
increase of 260% between 1969 and 1975, peaking at over
150,000 in the latter year."’* However, this boom did not 
last long. Beginning in the 1970's, the tourist industry 
entered a period of decline. The Swazi tourist industry has 
been too heavily reliant on the South African vacationer as 
the source for its market, a factor which is largely a 
function of regional relations and apartheid. This factor, as 
will be argued below, has contributed to the decline of the 
industry in the 1970's when other developments and changes in 
South Africa’s policy impacted on the Swazi tourist industry.
Crush and Wei lings, in a comparative study of Lesotho and 
Swaziland observe how changes in South African policy since 
the late 1970*s has led to significant corresponding changes 
in the whole character of intra-regional tourism. With the
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•st&bXishsent of similar tourist attractions in tha hoaolands, 
much closer to south Africa's population centras, tha Swaci 
tourist industry has greatly suffered. However, since 1986, 
the Swazi government has been investing heavily into tourism, 
and it has been growing steadily. Nevertheless, with the 
transition towards the scrapping of the apartheid laws in 
South Africa ich had prohibited such activities as gambling 
and other tourist attractions, any prospects for further 
development in the Swazi tourist industry are unlikely, at 
least in the medium to long-term future.
The tourist industry in Swaziland also reflects the close 
alliance between the Swazi state and foreign capital, which is 
achieved sometimes at the expense of the ordinary citizen. An 
example is that of two newly-planned hotel coi^lexes, financed 
by Sheraton International, which are due to be constructed at 
Elangeni and Siphofaneni. These have sparked fierce resistance 
from the residents of these areas, following an eviction order 
from the state. Because of the resistance and struggle that 
has ensued, construction of these hotels has not yet begun.
However, despite some losses, Swaziland beginning from 
the early 1980's benefited from sanctions against South Africa 
through a mini-industrial economic boom. However, because of 
changing conditions in the region, this botm did not last 
loi^, with implications on its future development prospects.
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2 Prespaets for rutoro Davelopmont in Th* Ragion
2.1 Brief Economic Boom.
Recent political devalogmanta in South Africa hava 
results in sever* economic prohleam, mainly as a 
result of disinvestment and sanctions, with obvious 
consequences for the economies of the nelgbhouring 
states in the region.^’
Interestingly, Swaziland has been able to use the 
imposition of sanctions on South Africa to its own advantage. 
In a nutshell, Swaziland has used its access to the South 
African market so that for a while "it seemed to be a small 
customs union success story, in contrast to Botswana and 
Lesotho. This period was marked by the opening up of 
various industries. "The share of exports going to South 
Africa nearly doubled in five years from 20% in 1979 to 37%in 
1982."*’ Most importantly, these were largely manufactured 
goods like televisions and fertilizer. These sectors included 
firms such as Langa Brick aiul YKK, the Japanese zip fastener 
company which produce mainly for the South African market.
Sanction-busting has tended to give South Africa access 
to markets outside the region not normally available to it. 
Betty Harris gives the exaz^le of Injobo, whi^ is a large 
clothing factory in the Matsapha Industrial Estate. Originally 
it was a branch of a South African textile firm that relocated 
in Swaziland for the purpose of relabelling South African 
garments 'Made in Swaziland* for sale in international
84
oarkets. However, it failed in late-1887 and wa# purchased by 
EastbrooK, an American firm.^ Another example is that of an 
international shoe company, Bata, which decided to close its 
factory near Durban and relocate in the facility previously 
occupied by Salora, providing 500 jobs'.^ There have also 
been reports of straightfoward sanction-busting operations 
involving repackaging facilities in the Kingdom. "The 
appearance of 'Swazi wine* in international markets. is an 
example of this.
However, changes in South African policy, mainly the 
introduction of attractive incentives in the Bantustans, 
together with a recession in the early-l980*s, saw an abrupt 
end to the boom, with serious repurcussions on the Swazi 
economy. Among other things, there was "a direct loss of 1500 
jobs which constituted an eighth of the manufacturing work 
force and a failure to create six hundred more jobs that had 
earlier been announced. The total effect of this is that 
"in the next three years following that period, four lira» 
moved from Swaziland to the Bantustans, while others closed 
down in the face of Bantustan competition."^
Of the companies which moved to the Bantustans, the most 
notable was Swazi Carpets, which, hardly two years after 
opening its plant in Swaziland, moved to the Transkei, putting 
183 workers out of work. Swazi Metalware, a Chinese owned 
company followed suit and moved to Bophuthatswana, putting 130 
women out of work. In 1983, Kirsh industries abandoned a far
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advanced plan to build a textile mill that would have provided 
1000 joba, and decided to locate in King Williamm Town, a 
decentralisation point adjoining the Ciskei Bantustan which 
enjoys similar benefits.**^
The state, realising this massive flight of industries, 
through KIOCS produced an attractive investment incentive 
package which was revised in March 1985. Nevertheless, the 
size and location of Swaziland has made it difficult for 
Swaziland to compete for foreign Investment, especially with 
the Bantustans, which, compared to Swaziland have had more 
attractive incentive packages. In 1985, for example, "company 
tax in Swaziland was 37.5*, much lower, certainly than South 
Africa's 50%. But with Botswana at 30% and the Homelands at 
10%, investors have at their disposal alternative 
bargains."** In a post-apartheid South Africa, it is likely 
that this homeland competition would cease to be a crucial 
factor with regard to investment prospects in Swaziland 
itself. However, the region's predicted general loss of 
attractiveness would still decrease the possibilities of 
overall potential investment, with obvious consequences to 
small dependent states such as Swaziland. In a wider sense, 
this is a reflection of these states' dependence in part on 
South Africa's regional policy and overall stability.
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2.2 Further Marginalisation.
Political, économie and social change in South Africa is 
bound to have major implications for Swaziland's economy. But 
whether these changes wuld benefit Swaziland in the short-and 
long-term future is debatable. Writers such as de Vlettar and 
Hanlon have predicted that some of the adverse effects given 
current trends stay be the loss of investment to South Africa 
and the decrease in Swaziland's customs revenue.
The Swazi government is aware that the increase in 
investment that enabled the growth that Swaziland has enjoyed 
in the 1980*s is not likely to be sustainable in the aediua- 
to long-term, A report in the Montreal Gazzette stated "As 
South Africa liberalizes its racial policies, Swaziland is 
worrying that investors, especially those from Europe and the 
US may begin again thinking about investing directly in South 
Africa. An economist for a major international 
development agency put it this way "Should South Africa become 
an internationally acceptable trade power, it would present 
the immediate attraction of a better infrastructure to 
potential investors. Swaziland would have to compete with that 
as well as the better wages and conditions for workers that 
South Africa would be in a position to offer."*®
Many investors have tried to distance themselves from 
South Africa while gaining access to the EC and the PTA. In 
the face of the current changes and reforms, these
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circuastancss could chang* quit# rapidly, aspacially now that
there are better prospecte for a peaceful transition to a non-
racial democracy in South Africa.
Expressing this concern, which is also a typical
indication of the Swaei dilemma in the regional political
economy, the Swaxi Prime Minister, Obed Dlaaini stated
This is something we all hope for, but it is outside 
our control and it must be recognized that su<di an 
event could place great strains on our economy.
Looking into the long term , the Prime Minister continued,
Thus the largest single impact on our economic future à 
something that we are unable to plan for and
incorporate in our economic strategies for the
1990*s. What we can do however, is to ensure that
Swaziland remains as attractive an investment area as Î jssible.**
As argued earlier, Swaziland's af^arent loss of attractiveness 
is best demonstrated by its tourist industry which was once 
booming, and, in the 1970's, one of the best in the region. 
With the current on-going changes in the nature of regional 
relations, Swaziland is likely to face increasing competition, 
especially from Uie homelands which have had more attractive 
investment packages in receny years. But, even if Swaziland 
suceeds in overcoming competition on all counts, there still 
remains the problem of high wages, which, experts point out, 
constitute a big burden on industry. Therefore, with the 
evaporation of the boom that gave rise to the econmaic growth 
of the 1980*s, in the 1990's and beyond, Swaziland's position 
in the region is likely to be further eroded, unless wage
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3 P@#t-8pmrth#id 8e«nariu
Th# quastlon of regional ira is on# that is likely to
assume even greater importance as we move towards the twenty-
first century. This is already evident in Oie global
r^ionalization processes that are currently taking place.
Mittelman has argued that
In the post cold-4far era, with heightened competition 
among transnational corporations for profits, the role 
of regionalism is increasingly Important, yet the 
scholarly discourse on the NIDL em^Aasises the world­
wide integration of industry and globalisation of finance, but utterly fails to conceptualize the 
regional and svüs-division of labour.^
Santho and Sejanamans argue that, based on trends of
global regionalization-i.e Europe 1992 and the consolidation
of the North American free trade area- post-apartheid South
Africa will emerge in a hostile global environment. In this
predicted hostile context, the viability of small states is
likely be put in doubt, with their political economies likely
to become further marginalized.^
Some writers have argued that at tha very least,
neighouring states will expect a majority-ruled government in
South Africa to be willing to totally re-negotiate the customs
union and accept a much less one-sided relationship, although,
this could bring them into sharp conflict with the new
goverrasent. However, many scholars seem to be agreed that
South Africa is likely to remain the hegemonic power in the
region even after majority rule. As Gavin Haasdorp puts it
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"the question of relationships between a drainant regional 
economy and its smaller neigbhours is one that will renain in 
{K?st•apartheid South Africa."^
With specific reference to the BLS, SJA Ayes suggests 
that Swaziland and the other SACU members should renegotiate 
the agreement with tha post-apartheid government in South 
Africa.**
For a post-apartheid South Africa, this possible 
continued dependence is likely to have severe consequences for 
the Swazi economy. South African industrialists {be they 
private or parestate1) are likely to continue to maintain 
their dominance in the region, although the South African 
economy itself will be faced with conflicting pressures as 
regards industrialization and trade policy. In this regard, 
two scenarios posed by Joseph Hanlon and oUiers seem likely, 
both of which have disadvantages for Swaziland.
Clearly, at least in the short- to medium-term, a 
majority-ruled South Africa will be faced with internal 
demands for redistribution. Therefore, local demand for 
consumer goœls could rise rapidly, stretching industrial 
capacity to the limit, which would tend to reduce exports to 
the neighbouring states. The implications for Swaziland, which 
is dependent for 90% of its imports, (including basic 
foodstuffs) on South Africa, are clear*
However, the continuii^ economic crisis; the effects of 
SAP, and financial difficulty in which a post-apartheid South
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Africa is likely to find itaalf may lassan the likelihood of 
this scenario occurring. Instead, faced with the harsh costs 
of SAP, South Africa may increase its exports as a means to 
earn much needed foreign exchange. Nonetheless, if experts 
continue to be maintained, then svasiland's dependence on the 
South African economy will continue, thus placing its sheer 
survival on changing whims and conditions in South Africa. 
Though it may be too early to make predictions, it seems 
apparent that the immediate post-aparthe id period will witness 
witness many changes, all of which are likely to have 
implications for swasiland.
3.1 Migrant Labour.
On the question of migrant labour, which has largely 
served to alleviate unemployment problems for the neigbhouring 
states, there also seem to be at least two conflicting 
scenarios. Hanlon and others have argued that since a post- 
aparthe id South Africa is likely to be under severe pressure 
to give jobs to Black South Africans, migrant labour from 
neigbhouring countries may decrease substantially, with 
obvious implications for these countries, especially Lesotho 
tdiicb has over 401 of its active labour force working in South 
Africa.
On the other hand, Santho and Sejanamans et.al argue that 
the abandonment of the compound system in post-aparthe id South
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Africa may anabla vorkara to sova with thair familiaa, 
raaulting in aasaiva migration that may drain thaaa countriaa* 
populations to tha point that thay may avan oaasa to axiat. 
These scenarios, whan applied to a country such aa Swaziland, 
become complex and therefore do not render thamaalvaa to easy 
projection.
However, in tha Swazi oaaa, if currant trends are 
anything to go by, tha most likely scenario M y  be a huge 
migration of Swazis to South Africa to take up skilled j ^ s  
(because of the lack of skills in the Black population in 
South Africa), as is already happening. This will result in a 
huge brain-drain, with obvious conseguenoes for the 
development of the country. For example, in 1990, at the start 
of reforms in South Africa, the University of Swaziland 
experienced a lecturer 'ex'odus* of unprecedented proportions 
as many lecturers left for south Africa, mainly to the 
Homelands (notably Bophuthatswana). This reached a crisis 
proportion towards the end of that year, culminating in a 
series of student class boycotts, protesting thm non­
availability of lecturers for many courses which were supposed 
to be offered.
What is more, this trend is likely to continue as more 
Swazis froa all ranks in the professions - technocrats, 
teachers, university lecturers,- go searching for so-called 
'greener pastures' across the border. With South Africa and 
the Bantustans offering competitive salaries and other fringe
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b#n#fltm which th# BLS cannot afford, th# brain-drain i##u# 1# 
likaly to bacom# a v«ry serious proolam for thas# countries in 
tha 1990's and bayond.
What is more* in a post-apartheid South Africa, the 
picture is likely to be gloomier, especially for unskilled job 
seekers, who in Swaziland constitute the bulk of the 
unemployed (most of whom are high school graduates). Hanlon 
observes that in an attempt to correct the injustices created 
by the racial policy of apartheid, any new government in South 
Africa will face heavy internal demands for jobs and for 
increased spending on social amenities such as health, 
education, infrastructure end development in general.This 
has clear implications for Swaziland, a country faced with a 
high and rising rate of unemployment, which has been largely 
dependant on the South African migrant labour system to 
alleviate this problem. Clearly, a majority-ruled South Africa 
would be under very strong pressure to give these jobs to 
South Afrl ans. A look at present trends would indicate that 
migrant labourers from BLS are being increasingly replaced by 
South Africans when they retire or experience delay in 
renewing their contracts.In this regard, Betty Harris notes 
now that ''only 5% of the males recruited in any given year 
are novices.
Furthermore, higher mechanization has meant that mining 
has become a skilled job for a select few, a skill which the 
bulk of the unemployed in Swaziland do not posses.
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Swaziland is, then, prsssntly unabls to creats jobs for 
even half of its school Isavers sach year, and the 
unemployment problem, according to the late King, is reaching 
'crisis proportions'.®’ Unemployment affects all sections of 
the population, including university graduates and labourers. 
Nuiyenyi notes that " a  new term 'sidlani*, has been coined to 
describe the unemployed youth - the lumpens who are notorious 
for house break-ins and hold-ups in urban areas. The level of 
crime has dramatically increased, causing instability and 
social decay.”*® In recent years, this has been further 
aggravated by the problem of refugees and illegal immigrants, 
mostly from Mozambique, who come to the country and have no 
employment opportunities. "The Swazi authorities have linked 
the influx of Mozambicans to the upsurge of armed crime in the 
country. This has led to a crackdown by police on Mozambican 
refugges, on which the Interior ministry has put a figure as 
high as 134,000."*’
Therefore, according to the two above scenarios, 
Swaziland in a post-apartheid South Africa is likely to suffer 
what may be called *a double blow'. Whilst, on the one hand, 
the lack of skills amongst the South African black population 
may result in a massive migration of most skilled Swazi 
workers, thus resulting in a huge brain drain, the 
mechanization and high skill requirements in the gold mines 
may drastically decrease ̂ sployxsent opportunities for the bulk 
of Swaziland's unemployed, i.e, unskilled high school
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graduates.
3.2 Prospects for Regionalism: The Case of SADCC and PTA
Likewise, the question of the role which regional 
organizations such as SADCC and the PTA will play in a post- 
apartheid South Africa is still unresolved. Hoover, there 
seems to be a consensus among scholars who have written on the 
subject that the coming of majority rule in South Africa will 
have certain implications for these regional organizations.
Amin, Chitala, et al, writing in the sid-1980's note 
"indeed, with the likelihotxl that South Africa will attain 
majority rule within the next decade, then must come a 
fundamental change in the conception of SADCC, which up to now 
has been firmly based on the need to delink from South 
Africa.**^ Using the political economy approach, scholars 
such as Carol Thompson have questioned whether the * unresolved 
contradictory social relations of production within and arong 
participant states would;'. *t eventually create enourmous 
problems."^ Furthermore, though SADCC's main objective is 
to reduce dependence on South Africa, its long-term objective 
is to aim at reducing dependence on any single external 
source. Despite this formulation, SM3CC efforts have almost or 
exclusively been directed toward the objective of reducing 
dependence on South Africa, thus giving extra-regional
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dependence eecondaxy isportence. As ^os^son puts it "the 
danger is that new or reinforced old dependencies may develop 
to the extent that SADCC runs the risk of substituting one set 
of dependencies (on South Africa) on another (extra- 
regional) Therefore, in this regard, and in a possible 
majority-ruled south Africa, "the question is Wiether in the 
forseeable future SADCC and Southern Africa will be able to 
1reak away from domination by imperialism and international 
capital and work towards autonomous development. It has 
been argued that "for countries such as BLS, which are among 
the weaker states in the region, a shift of emphasis from SACU 
to SADCC and PTA, or in a wider sense, from South Africa to 
Europe and the US, would make little difference to their 
positions of vertical dependency."*^
The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) Agreement may not offer 
many new advantages or alternatives, either, despite its 
recent plans to become a common market. Such an economic 
community would face problems, since the countries of the PTA 
are at largely the same level of development: essentially they 
are all primary producers with much the same range of products 
and only limited industry. What there is of the industry is 
present in Kenya, Mauritius and Zimbabwe, three countries 
which stand to Wnefit most from new enterprises and by the 
process of industrial polarization that is already becoming 
evident. ïk>raover, there are marked differences in ideology 
between members. The failure of the East African common market
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can be attributed to political problem#, as well as to unequal 
distribution of economic benefits, both of which axe present 
in tbs PTA.
The question of the role which South Africa post­
apartheid will play in the regional integration processes is 
still subject to debate. With specific reference to the PTA, 
a spokesman for Swaziland's Federation of Employers expects 
problems if south Africa is admitted to the PTA and sanctions 
are removed. He observes "the liberal emotionalism that gave 
rise to support and investment in countries like Swaziland 
would evaporate overnight and the pragmatism of the market 
forces would take over."*^ But for their survival, he 
continues, "the countries of Southern Africa will have to 
collaborate with South Africa, otherwise. South Africa will 
soak up world markets with the efficiency of its economic and 
financial management and the sophistication of its 
infrastructure. Other countries in the region could simply 
bmzome social and economic backwaters.”^
Though some writers such as Margaret Lee argued in the 
mid-1980's that SADCC goals can only be achieved after 
apartheid is destroyed, in the 1990*s, with the imminent 
transition towards majority rule in South Africa, there seem 
to be emerging what could be called South Africa's own 
version of what should become of the states in the region in 
their efforts towards achieving 'collective self-reliance*.
According to Santho and Sejananane, South Africa's latest
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régional policy perspective was summarized by South Africa's 
Foreign Affairs Minister, .'ik Botha, when he stated that 
"Southern African countries can maximize their real 
independence by committing themselves unreservedly to cub- 
regional economic integration in their struggle to lessen 
dependency and create healthy interdependent 
relationships."*’ The Foreign Minister further stated that 
"there was an urgent need to expand domestic and sub-regional 
pr^uctive capacity with a view to increase the level of 
collective self-reliance. Emphasis must therefore turn to 
greater economic self-reliance.
According to Santho and Sejanamane, these two statements 
can be Interpreted as South Africa's attempt to continue to 
serve its own interests at the expense of the rest of the 
states in the region. They argue,
Therefore, in preparation for these developments, one 
can intepret the Foreign Affairs Minister as suggesting 
that Southern Africa should become a regional economic 
collective which will cushion South Africa from these 
régionalisation processes globally and enable it to 
safeguard regional markets and maintain access to 
regional resources, both human and material.
Therefore, it seems clear that post-apartheid South
Africa is likely to remain a force to be reckon^ with, a
factor which may lai^ely determine the possible direction and
prospects for any efforts at closer integration in the region.
Hence, it seera clear from the above argument that
Swaziland's integration into the South African economy has
laid it open to being directly affected by conditions and
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Change» in that country a» they unfold. In a possible 
majority-ruled South Africa, though some of the structures of 
dependence may be renegotiated with a view to bringing about 
more equality among South Africa and its neighbours, there 
seems to be a general consensus that South Africa latter is 
likely to remain the dominant power, with both developmental 
and foreign policy implications for the rest of the states in 
the region.
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CH«pt«r 4 SWAZILAND IN THE GMSAL NLITICAL ECQMOMÏ» ŒIDL 
MIDEl
1 Zatroduotios
Swaziland'» pro-capitali»t orientation may have brought 
benefits, most of which, however, have hardly spread to the 
masses of the people. Moreover, its growing monocultural 
dependence has laid its economy open to the vicissitudes of 
the world market economy, with implications given the evolving 
New International Division of Labour (NIOL). Furthermore, 
Swaziland's primary relations with the pro-capitalist states 
such as Taiwan and Israel have not enabled it to lessen its 
dependence either on south Africa in the region or on the 
global economy. However, given the transformations which have 
since occurred at both the global and regional levels, the 
country's pro-capitalist orientation, which has earned it much 
aid and development assistance, say cease to be an important 
factor, with obvious implications in this post-Cold War era.
As has been argued, then, Swaziland is committed to a 
capitalist path of development, a policy which has served the 
interests of both Swazi rulers and international capital well. 
Winter has argued that ''the prime role of the pmst-colonial 
state in Swaziland is to reproduce capitalist relations of 
production. Concretely this has taken the form of the creation
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mftm in Swaziland is to rsproducs capitalist relations of 
production. Concretely this has taksn the form of th# creation 
by ths state of the conditions for the extended reproduction 
of capital.*' An fxanple of this is the attitude of the state 
towards foreign investors and the conditions provided for 
foreign investment. In this regard, Winter has further argued 
that "the state has openly declared its support for foreign 
investment and has vowed to protect the rights of foreign 
investors.** This is best exemplified by the Swazi King, 
Sobhuza II, who, speaking about investment in the country 
said
It is an accepted fact of life that tw> hands wash each 
other. Investors should get a good share of the profits 
from their money they have entrusted this Kingdom, and 
the Swazi should get an equal share for his labours. 
Overlooking this cardinal principle would result into a 
chaotic situation,*
Thus, Swaziland has relied heavily on foreign capital 
for its development as the second national development plan 
pointed out:
To supplement domestic savings, government will 
continue its policy of encouraging the inflow of private 
capital for productive purposes. Substantial financial 
incentives are offered to suitable investors, company 
tax rates are moderate, appreciable tax allowances are 
available.*
This policy seems to have served both the Swazi state and 
foreign capital well, at least in the immediate post­
independence period. The economy grew quite rapidly in the 
1960’s and 70*s. Economic gro%rth, however, slowed down 
considerably during the 19S0's as a result of the world
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annua. Howavar, since 1981, GNP has çrovm at an avarags of a 
Bars 0.31 par yaar."*
Tha World Bank's figuras for GHP par haad in 1988 put 
Swaziland at $810. According to IBRD definition, this makes 
tha Kingdom a lower middle income country. Tha Bank notes, 
navarthalass, that despite this, many of tha features of an 
undardaveloped economy are present, and economic development 
has been uneven and distorted. Therefore, though Swaziland has 
succeeded in attracting foreign private capital, the benefits 
have bean slow in spreading to the masses of tha population, 
especially tha peasantry based in the rural areas.
Swaziland also has a growing debt burden. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit reports that Swaziland's public debt has 
grown significantly since 1960, the burden having been further 
aggravated by exchange movements. ''Total external debt grew 
to $238 mn in 1985, lilangeni/rand depreciation took this as 
a proportion of GDP to 64%. By 1989, the total outstanding had 
risen to $282 mn, but this represented 50% of GDP. To show the 
effects of the exchange movements, for exai^le, although debt 
service rose to 23% in dollar terms in 1985, in lilangeni 
terms it almost doubled as a result of currency 
depreciation."*
Like most Third World countries, Swaziland is mainly a 
primary commodity exporter. Its economy has grown increasingly 
dependent on sugar as the major export crop and foreign 
exchange earner, its other major exports include wood pulp and
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citrus fruits. This monocultural dspsndancs has meant that
fluctuations in tha prices of these commodities in the world
market economy have largely determined Swaailend *
fortunes/misfortunes. As B)oth argued,
Swaziland's involvement in agri-business since World 
war II has taught It Iwth the benefits and dangers of 
involvement in the world economy. Sugar, forestry and 
other ventures have brought prosperity, inclining badly 
needed employment opportunities to many segments, but 
they have also demonstrated the hazards of dependency m 
foreign market forces.?
This overall policy has resulted in Swaziland's economy
remaining largely primary export-oriented and heavily
dependent on changing whims and conditions in the world market
economy, with both developmental and foreign policy
implications.
1.1 Monoculture Dependence: The Politics of Sugar
The position of the sugar industry in Swaziland's 
political economy has grown to assuw great importance, mainly 
due to the country's dependence on sugar exports, which have 
increased dramatically since indpendence. It has also become 
the country's largest foreign exchange earner.
The sugar imiustry has Wcome the country's largest 
direct employer, thus providing much nee*#d e^loyment to most 
of the unskilled workers in the country, in 1986, *'it 
provided work for approximately 13000 of the wage-earning
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population, with an aatimatad 14% of tha total population 
dapanding on it for thair llvalihood. *** Howavar, in rocant 
yaars tha augar industry has baan moving towards higher 
mechanization in tha interest of being more competitive in the 
world market economy. This has bean happening in tha face of 
high and growing unemployment and continued decline both in 
tha price and demand of sugar in tha world market economy.
Tha importance of tha sugar industry, which is also an 
indication of tha country's ovar-raliance on tha export of a 
single commodity, became clear during tha presentation of tha 
1987/88 budget. Tha Minister of Finance, Sibusiso Dlaaini 
stated that ''after two years of gloom and dispondancy, ha was 
able to 'adopt a tone of guarded optimism* and report a 9% 
growth in 1986. He went on to say that this growth was due to 
a 35% increase in sugar production over the year,"* a fact 
which underlines tha role of sugar earnings as the principal 
determinant of Swaziland's short term economic fortunes.
Since 1982/83, total sugar production in Swaziland has 
averaged approximately 380 OOO tonnes per year, of which only 
20 000 is consumed locally. This means that 94.5% of the 
country's production must be exported. Thus Swaziland has 
become tied to the world sugar market and vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of massive international sugar price 
fluctuations."W) Although sugar's contribution to foreign 
exchange earnings has fluctuated over the years, it still 
remains the highest single source of foreign exchange
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•amines* In 1970, it contributad 30%, in 1980, it aooountad 
for 40% and 1983 it was 39%."" Until rscsntly, Svaiiland's 
Bain sugar sarksts havs baon ths US and ths EC, but dus to ths 
fluctuations in sugar demand in ths world market economy, 
Swaziland has had to diversify its sugar markets.
Swaziland is a msmbsr of ths Lcbm* convention under which 
it has a preferential quota for its sugar and beef. Britain 
has partly used this to encourage Swaziland's pw-capitalist 
foreign policy orientation. Bischoff argues, for example that 
"under Lome 1 and II conventions, EC aid to Swaziland, given 
its small size and population, came to be disproportionately 
high. In the period 1975-84, Swaziland was injected viXii aid 
payments loans and aid projects valued at E160M or E380 per 
head of population."'^ The reasons for such special 
treatment lay in the general imperialist objective of 
strengthening its capitalist orientation.
Bischoff identifies at least four arguments advanced by 
the EC for Swaziland’s special treatment:!) That Swaziland is 
situated in a politically sensitive area and therefore 
deserves 'international* and EC aid; 2) That the country is 
attractive for official donor aid, government to government 
aid and international organization aid, because it is close to 
South Africa but presents a positive non-apartheid version of 
racial coexistence to the area; 3) That the country's 
government has a liberal approach to the economy as opposed to 
many of its neighbours with socialist orientations and 4) That
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sost of th# country*# QNP ia produced by privât# ##ctor
•ntarpri## and ao it ia tharafor# ariantad towaNa afficiancy,
which Baana that aid can alao ba apant productively around
auch activities.’*
Britain has played a big role in maintaining Swat Hand's
pro-capitalist development and foreign policy slant, using
Swasiland'a membership in tha Lome convention (with tha EC) to
achieve this goal, whan ths Swacl government was contemplating
expanding tha sugar industry, tha EC and tha European
Development Bank ware approached and agreed to assist in
financing and building a third sugar mill. Tata and Lyle, tha
British sugar monopoly, mastarmindedg this project. As
Bischoff argues
Eventually, sugar became tha means by which Swaziland 
increased its financial dependence on tha EEC, came to 
owe tha EDF and tha European Investment Bank 9.5% of 
all its debts in 1962/83, so that together with its 
debt commitment to Britain and the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG), Swaziland's debts by the mid-80's to EEC 
countries were projected to make up at least 431 of all 
its debt obligations.’*
Swaziland's continued heavy reliance on the US and the EC 
markets has entailed certain foreign policy implications. 
Swaziland, being greatly indebted to these group of countries, 
could not adopt a foreign policy position that would alienate 
th«B. Thus, US and British interests have become important 
considerations in the formation of its domestic and foreign 
policy initiatives, a factor which has largely served to 
maintain its pro-capitalist orientation.
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However, with the end of the Cold War, the advent of 
global regionalization processes and the aove towards the 
dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, Swaziland's relative 
importance to Britain and tha other EC countries may decrease, 
as these countries become more pre-occupied with themselves, 
in the wake of the Integration of the 1992 European market, 
among other related developments and such other related 
developments.
1.2 Attempts at Diversification,
Swaziland, like many developing countries, has sought to 
moderate these hazards by diversifying into other industries, 
mainly light manufacturing, food processing and tourism. 
However, in so doing, Swaziland has confronted the dilemma of 
creating conditions attractive enough to lure foreign 
investment, while ensurirg that national, rather than foreign 
capital maintains control. This has been part of a growing 
trend amongst almost all the other countries in the region in 
their attempts to moderate the effects of dependence on one or 
a few primary commodity exports and trading partners, and in 
their reactions to the effects of structural adjustment. 
Swaziland has also made Attempts to expand the markets for its 
exports. Thus, in addition to the conclusion of the Lome' 
agreement, which ensured a market for Swaziland's sugar, the
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country's citrus is now exported to about thirteen countries 
and woodpulp to about forty. However, Swaziland's major 
capitalist markets have remained basically the same since 
independence- i.e, USA, Japan, Canada, and the UK.
Alan Whiteside identifies three elements in the 
manufacturing sector which have developed in the region over 
the years; 1} agricultural and mineral(raw material) 
processing; 2) consumer goods (light industries); and 3) 
capital goods (heavy industries), the distribution of which 
has resulted in uneven spatial development, both within and 
between countries in the region."" This distribution pattern 
has been characterized by the concentration of heavy 
industries in South Africa, the most developed economy in 
Southern Africa, leaving the remaining countries to diversify 
mainly into agricultural and light manufacturing, thus 
maintaining the regional economic status-quo.
Swaziland, after realizing that the sugar industry was 
experiencing great losses due to depressed world market prices 
which reduced demand, started encouraging and engaging in 
light manufacturing. However, what has since become a growing 
source for concern is that most of the manufacturing firms are 
foreign- owned. Vet, at present, after agriculture, the 
manufacturing sector is the single largest employer of private 
sector labour, of which about three-quarters were employed in 
agro-industry.
In 1978, ''it was estimated that 33% of all enterprises
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were foreign-owned, 28% were joint ventures, 39% %fere locally 
owned, the latter being restricted largely to service 
industries and small- and medium-sired manufacturing and 
trading operations."^* Some of these non agro-basad 
manufacturing firms originate from South Africa, though in 
recent years there has been a relatively diverse inflow of 
firms from other countries as well.
As part of the movement of firms from high cost to low 
labour cost countries, an integral feature of the NIDL, East 
Asian firms have become the most predominant in the Swazi 
case. Among the most notable are the four clothing factories 
established by the Taiwanese. All these enterprises were aimed 
principally at the European and American markets. Alongside 
the Taiwan clothing ventures are Hatsapha knitwear, a Hong­
kong knitwear factory, whose major markets are South Africa, 
Europe and the US.
de Vletter calls these 'footlose industries, while Betty 
Harris refers to them as 'runaway shops'. Though Swaziland has 
benefited fiom the sudden inflow of capital, it still rexuiins 
to be seen how the current changes in South Africa would 
impact upon future investment patterns in the region. Current 
instability in South Africa, the main factor which has given 
rise to diverted investment from (most notably) the homelands, 
is one such factor warranting a grain of scepticism. It may 
not be too far-fetched to speculate that Swaziland's tmqwrary 
attractiveness, because of its relative peace and stability.
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remain# subject to future changes in South Africa and the 
whole region.
In this regard, de Vletter cautions against a too
simplistic interpretation of the Investors actions:
It is important not to lose a proper sense of 
perspective: Swasiland may be attractive to those who 
want to leave South Africa, but the region as a whole 
remains unstable, and, for the time being, there are 
unlikely to be many extra-regional investors interested 
in (^portunitles in southern Africa, save for ways of 
exploiting sanctions and instability.
Furthermore, though the inflow of capital has benefited
the Swazi economy in some ways, Its growing capital-intensive
nature has imposed great constraints in terms of employment
creation. This has been happening in the face of high and
growing unemployment. Some firms, most notably in the textile
industry, have been striving, at best, to retain their current
labour force; this means that no new jobs are being created.
In large part this is a function of the NIDL. With improved
technology transfer from the industrialized to the
industrializing world, there has been a growing tendency
towards more capital-intensive industrialization, with
implications for countries such as Swaziland who face high and
rising unemployment problems.
Thus, even though the economy has been growing quite
rapidly, employment generation has not been able to keep pace
with growth in the supply of labour force, lAich has been
growing at the much faster rate of 7.4%.^* What is more, the
World Bank estimates that the number of new entrants to the
110
labour market will double between 1980 and 2000.
The evolving NIDL alao entails other i^lications for 
countries which have been highly dependent on rmsource-based 
activities. In the Swazi case, with low prices and reduced 
demand for its main exports- woodpulp, citrus, pineapple and 
sugar, prospects for future expansion in these areas is highly 
unlikely.
The total impact of this is that Swaziland's development 
efforts are likely to remain constrained by external factors. 
Its dependence on South Africa in the region and the world 
market economy, both environments which are undergoing 
momentous change, represent some of these externally imposed 
economic measures.
Though Swaziland has benefited from the imposition of 
sanctions on South Africa through a mini-industrial boom, such 
gains are not likely to be self-sustaining in the medium-term 
future. The current developments towards majority rule in 
South Africa points to swazilaiui's vulnerability in the event 
that sanctions are completely lifted.
Thus, the current recession in Swaziland's modem export- 
oriented sector will probably continue as long as there are 
reduced demands and falling prices for most commodities, 
especially sugar, a function of the world recession and the 




2.1 Relations with the Us.
Apart from the EC, it is the US that has become the most 
obvious proponent of Western policy in Swaziland. Bishoff 
argues that ''even though Britain is still a las^e donor of 
aid, Swazi foreign policy has increasingly looked towards the 
US for obtaining aid and support for its infrastructure as 
well as for backing in the World Bank to gain financial 
support and assistance.**®®
Swaziland's relations with the US have been primarily 
based on Swaziland's pro-capitalist orientation, and the US's 
attempt to contain communism in the region during the cold war 
period. Swaziland at independence had made it known to the us 
administration that it attached "utmost importance to its 
relations with the US and was willing to co-operate with it in 
the promotion of peace. Independence and justice in 
international relations.*®’ Swaziland hoped thereby to 
obtain technical assistance, aid, loans etc. However, at best 
the US has only been giving token aid, mainly in the form of 
scholarships and Peace Corps volunteers. The US also 
guaranteed Swazi sugar a certain quota, which also amounted to 
a t<Aen gesture.
However, with the end of the Cold War and superpower 
rivarly, countries such as Swaziland stay lose even the little
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Importanc# they had during the j^ak of the Cold War. Although 
it say be too soon to predict, if current trends are anything 
to go by, the US’s loss of interest in Svasilsnd is already 
becoming apparent- decreases in Peace Corps volunteers, 
scholarships, and in the sugar quota.
For example, "the US purchased 192 000 irïîort tons of 
sugar from Swaziland in 1978. However, since 1982, it has been 
cutting Swazi imports by 40% annually."** Furthermore, with 
the growing use of substitutes for most of the Third World's 
prtxiucts, US firxzs are now relying more heavily on isoglucose 
i.e home-produced by US agriculture as a sugar substitute. 
This has resulted in substantial losses in revenue for the 
sugar industry. It is also a clear indication of how the new 
international division of labour is affecting countries which 
are highly dependent on the export of a few primary 
commodities, a factor which is likely to differentiate states 
in the South into fourth and fifth worlds- given the fallacy 
of composition as encouraged by SAP.
Ihe government is not unaware of these trends and shifts, 
or of the continuing effects Wiich competition from sugar 
sustitutes will have on the sugar industry in particular and 
hence the economy in general. In this tsgard, ttere are hopes 
to expand local demand and to penetrate 8AKC markets. 
Locally, there are already signs of ej^nding markets, with 
three firms already requiring sugar: Coca-Cola, Borœnar and 
Swazi Can. Recently, a Natal-based firm in South Africa has
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also been purchaeii^r Swazi augar. In a further attempt te 
modify the affecte of decreaead pricee and demand, of the 
eugar-producing firme have alee been divereifying into other 
areas. As Betty Harris observes *'in response to declinirtg 
sugar prices, simunye sugar estate has been planting some 
alternative crops, including cotton; Ubombo Ranches, which 
supplies Big-Bend, is anticipating cultivating grapefruits on 
part of its holdings.”̂  Though there is no doubt that 
forging backward linkages and diversifying into other areas 
»%uld benefit the economy, such efforts are still in the area 
of primary cosat^ities whose decreased prices and demand have 
shown no sign of improving.
2.2 Other Foreign Relations.
As has been argued, Swaziland has been one of the more 
conservative regimes in the region. It has always been opposed 
to radical ideologies which advocate mass political 
I»rticipation and an alternative economic order to that of 
capitalism. As such it is ideologically anti-communist, even 
anti-socialist. Its diplomatic ties in Mbabane have been 
concentrated with such fellow anti-communist states (with Uie 
exception of Mozambique) as Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, UK 
and USA, all of which have played a distinctive major role in 
its development and foreign policy, at least until the 1990*s.
Daniel has argued that on international issues, Swaziland
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has adopted a position far closer to that of the US than most 
of the Third World. For example * in ths UN, swasiland has 
consistently sided with the US. It supported the US position 
on Israel and the FLO and took the Anglo-American position on 
both the Falklands and the shooting down of KAL
airliner.**
In this regard, Swaziland has been viewed by Western 
interests as a moderating force committed to peaceful change 
in Southern Africa. So the US Congress has supported security 
assis'~ance programs to Swaziland in the belief that stability 
in the Kingdom contributes significantly to regional security.
Swaziland's other central foreign relations, besides the 
US, Britain and South Africa, have been with three other 
distinctive states: Taiwan, Israel, and South Korea.
Swaziland, at the peak of the Cold War, had allied itself with 
these states themselves 'Pariah' states who wanted to 
cultivate friends in the Southern African region, their prime 
intention being to prevent the spread of 'communism'. 
Swaziland, with a pro-Westem slant in its foreign policy 
easily accomodated their interests. Bischoff has argued how 
the presence of Taiwan, Israel and South Korea worked against 
bringing greater iMependence in the country's international 
position: "Together with their pro-Westem policies, anti­
communism and growing ties with apartheid South Africa during 
the 1970's, Taiwan and Israel could not help Swaziland
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inoraass its inda^mtSanca of South Africa.**^
In ratum, thasa atataa providad financial, matarial and 
military aid to SwazilaM. Bischoff has arquad, howavar, that 
''Their aid instead draw Swaziland into dapanding on thair 
aacurity and military aaaistanca and tha adoption of a 
countar-inaurqancy proqraKsa for its army, which, 
idaologically could only aliunata it from tha liharatinq 
forças on tha auh-continant. An isolatad and countar- 
insurgency minded Swaziland could ba a valuable asset for 
South Africa contemplating its own total strategy. it is 
notable, for example, that "its relations with Israel endured 
even after the ïom Kippur war, whan all other African 
countries broke diplomatic relations with I s r a e l . I h i s 
aamad Swaziland substantial amounts of aid from Israel which 
were mainly geared towards development of the agricultural 
sector. This involved a nation-wide mobilization of tha youth 
in what came to ba known as 'Gcina' camps, where they ware 
taught basic agricultural skills, ftowaver, this project soon 
collapsed, mainly because after training, the youth could not 
return to Swazi-Nation Land (SNL) due to constraints related 
to ownership rights governing the Traditional Land Tenure 
System under which SNL is administered.
Swazi relations with South Korea were largely of a 
diplomatic and tenuous nature, with little material aid 
involved. On the other hand, Taiwanese aid was much more 
substantial, most of it in the form of military aid, and
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«çrioultural and amall handicraft project#.
Howavar, with tha and of tha Cold War and tha daoraama in 
auparpowar rivarly, thara ara obvi^a indication# that much 
'pariah state#' have mince lost interest in Swaziland. This 
entails substantial foreign policy implication# and tha 
general development of tha country in the post-{^ld War 
periml. Thair relations with Swaiiland have largely 
degenerated to those of a diplomatic nature.
ühis is more notable for Taiwan, which, at the peak of 
the Cold War had considered Swaziland as one of its'staunchest 
friends' in tha region. Expressing this sentiment, tha 
Taiwanese foreign Minister had stated, "Swaziland was one of 
our staunchest friends whan we needed friends. In return, we 
want to do our share in the economic development of Swaziland 
through our agricultural missions, the new handicraft mission 
and in other ways,
The subseqpient loss of interest by these states, is an 
indication that though Swaziland's pro-Western slant in its 
foreign policy may have earned it some degree of foreign 
assistance from the West and other pro-Westem states such as 
the three discussed above, the end of the cold war is likely 
to mark the end of such assistance. This is already beginning 
to show, w i m  both foreign policy and development implications 
over the medium- to long-term future. Therefore, if Swaziland 
was seeking a niche in the bipolar period, it would need to do 
so in this post Cold War era.
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aoknwM s aowmiT m  co î̂LDBioitg.
In oonolumion, Swaziland, a ammll country in 
international iwiationa, highly dependent on South Africa in 
tha region and international capital abroad, may find iteeIf 
faced with even harder choicee in the 1990's and beyond.
Though Swaziland may have reaped benefits from the 
imposition of sanctions against South Africa, especially in 
the 1980's, the nature of the resultant development is not 
likely to be self-sustaining and is subject to changes as tliey 
unfold in the region. The transition to majority rule in South 
Africa, as current events indicate, and the subsequent lifting 
of sanctions will have clear implications in this regard,
Furthermore, with the end of the global Cold War and 
superpower intervention, and possible regional Instability in 
the immediate post-apartheid period, southern Africa as a 
whole is not likely to be attractive to many foreign
investors, with obvious consequences for small dependent 
states like Swaziland. This will be further compounded by the 
global regionalization processes,(Europe 1992, the North 
American Free Trade Area) ASEAN, FTA etc. Clearly, with the 
North much more pre-occupied with itself,- including 
transformation and fragmentation in Eastern Euprope,- the
region is increasingly l^ing left to find its own solutions
and directions.
With most of the region going through some form or
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another of atruotural adjuatMnt, tha IMF/IBRD orthodoxy in 
the 1990*e - negotiating structural adjustment programmes with 
all states on a national basis - may further divide SAOCC 
membors, with adverse consequences for any other potential 
prospects at closer integration.
The conservative Swaai regime will be faced with 
increaeing challenges in the 1990*s and beyond. As we move 
towards the 21st century, with cross conditionalities like 
democracy, ecology, human rights and gender, the Swazi state 
will need to reassert its position and to adopt new tools and 
methods to deal with these challenges. The renewed drastic 
calls for multi-party democracy are one clear indication that 
the Swazi state is already having to respond to some of these 
demands. Seen in a wider context, these changes are a 
reflection of a global trend. It remains to be seen how the 
Swazi state and monarch will deal with these challenges in 
these ever- changing regional and global environments, arXI how 
they will try to meet the needs of the internal groups 
demanding change. As has been argued, the traditional network 
which has served as the legitizuite base for the maintenance of 
the monarch has been changing. This is evident in the sizeable 
number of chiefs calling for the replacement of the TiiOchundla 
by a system of direct elections to parliament. Thus, contrary 
to popular belief, calls for democratic government are 
beginning to filter down to the very core of the structures 
that have maintained the monarch in its place, a factor which
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i« likely to compel the monarch to aeriouely ooneider the 
demande emanating from the people.
With the white minority government in South Africa under 
increaeing preemure to relinquieh power to the black majority, 
the Swasi etate w u l d  loee its main source of external 
support. What is more, a radical ANC-led government, with its 
socialist orientation, would further threaten the largely 
conservative Swazi monarch, a factor which would be 
exacerbated by Swaziland's close integration into the South 
African economy.
Furthermore, the interventions of the us and UK 
governments in the freeing of the detained FUDEHO activists in 
March last year indicates that the future of foreign 
assistance to Swaziland is increasingly destined to be tied to 
a commitment by the Swazi government to democratic change. 
Thus, the process of trying to make at least some concessions 
to the people, as discussed above, is one that is likely to 
continue, as the state comes under increasing internal and 
external pressure to respond to these new demands,
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